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Abstract

Since the beginning of the Reagan Administration in
1981, there has been a dramatic change in policies
affecting the national parks and the National Park service.
The Department of the Interior's goals combined with the
economic strategies of this Administration have brought
about new park policies that have departed sharply from
those of the last two decades.

This thesis is designed to

distill some of the changes evidenced in park policy and the
Park service under the Reagan Administration.
Recent changes in park policy are analyzed by comparing
them to past policies.

Thus, there is a substantial review

of the history of the Park Service and park policies for
comparison.

As it was found, the new park policies

established during the Reagan Administration are often so
untraditional, they stand in a class by themselves.

They

have been hailed by developers and scorned by
preservationists in some cases, other cases find the reverse
to be true.

Regardless of the opinions of those interested

in the parks, however, the consequences of these policies
will last long after the end of this administration.

I certify that I have read this thesis and find that, in
scope and quality, it satisfies the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts.
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Author's Note

The impetus for writing a thesis on park management
stemmed from a discussion with Yellowstone's veteran park
winterkeeper, Steven Fuller.

Talking in his cabin nearby

the Grand canyon of the Yellowstone over the Christmas
holidays in 1987, he mentioned that the Park service was
negotiating with Yellowstone's concessionaire, T.W.
services, to open canyon Village for winter use.

For anyone

familiar with canyon Village in Yellowstone, this news would
come as a surprise.
canyon Village is currently located in the heart of
Yellowstone's wild country, in what is considered to be
prime grizzly bear habitat.1

Its site, at an elevation of

7748 feet, is annually acclaimed one of the coldest spots in
the continental United states.

Canyon Village's twenty-five

year old lodging facilities typically garner more attention,
however, ranking as some of the most rustic in the entire
park system.

In no way would the cabins or the lodge

currently on site be able to comfortably shelter
Yellowstone's wintertime visitors from its notoriously
frigid sub-zero wintertime temperatures.
Yet, what was more puzzling to learn from the
discussion with Steve Fuller, however, was the knowledge
lMichael Frome, "Park Tourism is Big Business",
National Parks, November/December 1984, p.16.

iv

v
that it was the Park Service that was the initiator of the
proposal to open Canyon Village for winter use.

As an

agency whose primary purpose is "to conserve the scenery",
their pursuit of wintertime concession operations at canyon
seemed illogical.2

Moreover, the 1916 National Park service

Organic Act specifically mandated that "national interest
must dictate all decisions affecting public or private
enterprise in the parks."3

Any "national interest" in

initiating wintertime operations at canyon Village, however,
was not apparent.4
As it stands, the beauty of the traditionally seasonal
concession operation at canyon allows people to come and
enjoy the Canyon during the summer, but when the location
closes in the fall, the flora and fauna have time to

2Public Law 65-235, 65th Congress, H.R. 15522, August
25, 1916, "An Act to Establish a National Park Service, and
for other purposes", United States Statues at Large 19151917, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917)
p.535.
3The Park service "Organic Act" as cited in Gundars
Rudzitis and Jeffrey Schwartz, "The Plight of the
Parklands", Environment, October, 1982, p.8.
4That "national interest is not apparent" is a personal
judgement. I have searched for any proposal regarding
Canyon Village wintertime operations and have found none.
If there was any evidence of public interest, logically it
would surface in the newspapers or, at least, in one of the
Greater Yellowstone Coalition's quarterly reports.
To date,
however, I can find no reference to it.

vi

recover.5
All spectacular viewpoints from the canyon rim remain
accessible to winter tourists without
facilities.

winter~ime

lodging

T.W. Services currently provides daily

transportation to the canyon in the winter, via snowcoaches
and snowmobiles, for daytime visitation.

Thus, the

questions begged to be answered: What was motivating the
Park Service to persuade T.W. Services to provide
accommodations and food services at canyon Village in the
wintertime?

Why was the Yellowstone Park service choosing

in this case to emphasize use over preservation?

And more

importantly, what was its significance, if any, in the
broader framework of future park service policy trends?

Any

satisfactory answer to these questions, however, first
requires an understanding of park management policies in the
past.

SDyan Zaslowsky, These American Lands, (New York:
Henry, Holt, and company, 1986) p.43.

Introduction

For almost a century, federal activism in domestic
affairs was considered to be an appropriate role of
government and was widely encouraged.

Any dispute over this

philosophy was "largely confined to academics and political
ideologues."1

Yet, within the last decade, this idea has

been challenged on a national scale.

Movements to promote

change have emerged from many political, economic, and
social arenas.

Yet, none have been

\
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powerful as those

within the Reagan Administration.
The Reagan Administration's philosophy with regard to
domestic affairs has been one of less government
intervention, with more private operation.2

To implement

this program of domestic reform, the Reagan Administration
sought Cabinet secretaries who would be willing to act as
agents "for the president's policy preferences."3

In doing

so, "President Reagan has made perhaps the most determined
lEd. John Palmer, Perspectives on the Reagan Years,
(Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1986) p.1.
2Richard P. Nathan, "The Reagan Presidency in Domestic
Affairs", as printed in Ed., Fred I. Greenstein, The Reagan
Presidency: An Early Assessment, (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1983) p.50.
3Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr. "The Reagan Administration and
the Renitent Bureaucracy", The Reagan Presidency and the
Governing of America, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute
Press, 1985) p.360.
1
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effort of any recent president to bend the permanent
government to his will."4
There are many examples of agencies who have undergone
extensive change during the Reagan Administration as a
result of his political appointees work.

Five cited in an

article by Lawrence E. Lynn include: the Employment and
Training Administration (ETA) of the Department of Labor:
the Forest service in the Department of Agriculture (FSDA);
the Mine Health and Safety Administration (MHSA) of the
Department of Labor; the Federal communications commission
(FCC); and the National Highway Traffic and Safety
Administration of the Department of Transportation.

As he

notes, these five agencies and their administrative
appointees had three primary things in common. The first
was that each agency head "appeared to reflect Reagan's
philosophy and intentions in making appointments to
subcabinet positions."5

secondly, they promoted "Reagan's

conservative ideology ... dutifully executed administration
policies concerning budget and staff reductions,
and ... formulated specific goals consistent with Reagan's
general policies."6
4Ibid., p.339.
5Ibid., p.344.
6Ibid.

Lastly, each agency head was noted for

L
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promoting "definite ideas about changing the agency beyond
merely carrying out Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and White House directives."?
Using Lynn's criteria to distinguish other Reagan
appointee's playing similar roles, one cannot help to note
as well the work of the Secretaries of the Interior James
watt and Donald Hodel.

It is my tenet in this thesis that

their work too serves as an excellent case study of the
changes promoted by Reagan appointees.

They too altered

agency infrastructure and policies to mirror those coming
from the White House.

Yet, in doing so they were also

experimenting with some of the nation's most precious
commodities: our national parks.
There are hundreds of national parks in the United
states and all have different policy needs.

The National

Park service (NPS) administers a variety of entities from
battlefields to historic homes to great primitive areas
such as Yosemite.

Thus, there is a need to set limitations

on the types of parks to be studied.

For the purposes of

this paper, I will focus primarily on policy changes as
they have effected the larger primitive parks, known to
many as the "crowned jewels."

These original national

parks, including Yosemite, Yellowstone, Glacier, Zion,

?Ibid.
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Bryce, and the Grand canyon, are the most vulnerable as
they cannot be replaced.

Their land forms and scenic

vistas are unique as is their ecological makeup.

Many

endangered flora and fauna are protected on these lands
where they have been unable to survive elsewhere.
In this thesis, it is my intent to explore in depth
the history of our national parks and the Park Service to
elucidate the significance of the policies watt and Hodel
were able to implement affecting them.

Did they truly set

in place radical new polices for the Park service and the
parks, or were these policy changes taking place gradually
over time?

I am also interested in how the Park Service

has changed as a result.

Are they truly administering the

national parks as charged by congress and the President to
do under Public Law 65-235? or are park policies today
being imposed upon NPS administrators by forces outside of
government or within the federal system?
Const~tutionally,

the President and congress have the

right to make laws and execute them.

To aid them in

executing laws affecting the national parks, they
established the National Park Service in 1916 with the
mandate that they should "provide for the enjoyment ... by
the public" of parklands in such a manner so as to
"conserve the scenery ... for the enjoyment of future

L
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generations. 11 8

In doing so, Congress and the President

created a third party, NPS, through which presidential and
congressional policies must be carried out.
While bureaucracies do not have any constitutional
authority and are thus technically subordinate to congress
and the President, historically they have gained a great
deal of power in their own right.
derived from their "expertise".9

This power is partially
As less than one percent

of Congress and the White House staff have degrees in
science and land management, historically these bodies have
deferred to the scientific expertise NPS officials offer
when making park policy.10

This reliance on bureaucratic

experts has frustrated the White House and congress at
times, but has more often than not been adhered to.
The Reagan Administration, however, chose not to
adhere to bureaucratic experts' decisions on park policy
that interfered with their agenda.

Instead, the

Administration relied on political appointees and the
8Public Law 65-235, as cited in United states statutes
at Large, (Washington, n.c.: Government Printing Office,
1917) p.535.
9Francis E. Rourke, "The Presidency and the
Bureaucracy: Strategic Alternatives", as cited in Michael
Nelson, The Presidency and the Political System (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984) p.339.
lOKathryn A. saterson, "Winding Up A Year In Congress",
Bioscience, November, 1986, p.659.
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powers granted to the President under the constitution.
This thesis does not intend to debate whether his policymaking strategies were legal or illegal.
that they were constitutional.

It is assumed

Rather, the questions this

thesis beg to answer are how did the Reagan Administration
view NPS experts, how did this Administration choose to use
its expert information, and how did this Administration's
agenda fit in with those previously established for the
national parks?
In order to find the answers to these questions, it is
necessary to do a historical review of the parks and the
National Park Service in order to delineate the public
policies affecting them.

This will help to determine

whether the Reagan Administration's goals for the parks and
the National Park Service were actually unprecedented.

The

environment and forces acting on the parks are also very
important so I will explore the parks from the perspectives
of

congress~

the public, the scientific community, and the

business community over time as well.
Chapter I will be a broad overview of the beginnings
of the national park idea and the national parks.

This

chapter will help to establish the context in which the
parks were established and it will help us to understand
American's early perspectives of the parks and the
subsequent polices set for them.

7

The second chapter will focus on the beginnings of the
National Park service.

With the establishment of a federal

agency whose mission it was to preserve the parks, the
national park idea was further refined as were the
management plans for them.

Also to be discussed are

outside "lobbying power influences."11

These various

lobbying power influences have also had a significant role
in writing Park Service policy and they have not hesitated
at times "to criticize the National Park Service when they
deemed it necessary."12

This chapter will focus on park

policies through 1950.
The third chapter will concentrate on park policy as
it is shaped by NPS, Congress, and the environmental
movement of the 1960's.

All three forces acted to reassess

the national park idea and subsequent management plans for
the "crowned jewels."

Also to be discussed will be the

directives emanating from the Department of the Interior
and the White House.13

These forces will also be evaluated

as shapers of park policy.
The fourth chapter will delineate the events and
llAlston Chase, "Sometimes What Threatens our Parks Is
The National Park service", New York Times, April 8, 1987,
p.A2.
12Ibid.
13Robert and Patricia Cahn, "Disputed Territory",
National Parks May/June 1987, p.30.
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forces shaping park policy just prior to the Reagan
Administration.

The record of the Nixon, Ford and Carter

Administrations will serve as a basis with which to compare
the Reagan Administration's role in shaping park
policy.
Finally, the fifth chapter will analyze the Reagan
Administration's influence on the national parks and the
National Park Service.

The role that Interior Secretaries

James Watt and Donald Hodel will be of prime importance as
political appointees of the President.

The National Park

service role in park policy making in comparison to the
Administration's, Congresses', and outside forces' powers
will be analyzed as well.

A conclusion will follow this

chapter wrapping up the changes that have taken place over
time and comparing them to changes that took place
specifically within the Reagan Administration. This will
help to determine whether the Reagan Administration truly
did play a revolutionary role in reforming park policy and
the bureaucracy in charge of administering them.

If this

was accomplished, this case study will also help to
determine how the Administration reshaped ''both public
policy and the modis operandi of the federal

9

bureaucracy."14

And this case study will determine if the

National Park Service, the primary agency responsible for
managing the "crowned jewels", and the parks themselves
were affected in result.

14Elizabeth Sanders, "The Presidency and the
Bureaucratic state", as cited in Ed. Michael Nelson, The
Presidency and the Political System, (Washington,D.C.-:-Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,1988) p.179.

Chapter I

on March 1, 1872, congress established Yellowstone
National Park.

It was the very first park of its kind not

only in the United states, but in the world.

The Act

establishing this park mandated that the land would be
"reserved and withdrawn from settlement, occupancy, or
sale."1

It mandated that regulations "provide for the

preservation, from injury or spoilation, of any timber,
mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonders".2
Lastly, the act moved to "provide against the wanton
destruction of the fish or game. 11 3

It was an unprecedented

piece of legislation passed by Congress with regard to land
use.

For the first time, congress declared that land did

not simply exist for one generation's use and profit.
Rather, Yellowstone had aesthetic value so great that it was
to be reserved not only for those living, but also for
future generations to enjoy.
By 1890, the western frontier was conquered.

Since

then, Yellowstone and the national park idea have become
l"An Act to set apart a certain tract of land lying
near the headwaters of the Yellowstone River as a public
park", as cited in Laws Relating to National Park service,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1933) p.26.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
10
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increasingly more important in the American mind.

From our

cement palaces, Americans needed to know there were still
areas in the United states were "natural forces still
predominate(d), where bison graze(d) freely and grizzly
bears roam(ed) unrestricted."4

For many, Yellowstone and

other national parks became this symbol of wildness.

They

were links to America's past in our continuing history.
With this in mind, as we look back to the actions and
policies leading to the reservation of wildlands, it is easy
for us to romanticize the past.

In our modern understanding

of the environment and ecology, we naturally look to our
American forefathers as having had incredible foresight to
realize the future need for such areas.

In a time of

abundant wilderness, they "conserved" land.

Yet, at the

time congress established Yellowstone National Park, ecology
or environmental management was not even a part of our
vocabulary.
While Congress moved to hold these original national
parklands in perpetuity, it was primarily done to ensure the
public would always have access to them for their
"enjoyment".

There was no consensus among these gentlemen

as to how these wildlands should be used or managed in order

4Wayne Owens, "Crying Wolf in Yellowstone", National
Parks, March/April 1988, p.16.

12
to retain their pristine character.5

Moreover, there were

no wildlife biologists or range specialists to consult.

For

Congress in the late lSOO's, there was nothing to compare
national parks to.

Nothing like a national park had "ever

been brought under administration before, not even for the
great military princes. 11 6
As Congress continued to set land aside as national
parks through the turn of the century, it became apparent
there would need to be a central agency administering these
properties.

On August 25, 1916, forty four years after the

establishment of Yellowstone, the National Park Service
(NPS) was created as the federal oversight agency for the
parks.

The establishing Act mandated that the Park service

"provide for the enjoyment ... by the public" of parklands in
such a manner so as to "conserve the scenery ... for the
enjoyment of future generations."7

In this statement of

purpose was an "equivocal mission", one the Park Service has
struggled with ever since.8
5Frank A. Waugh, "Technical Problems in National Park
Development", Scientific Monthly, January, 1918, p.560.
6Ibid.
?Public Law 65-235, as cited in United States statutes
at Large, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1917) p.535.
8Alston Chase, "How to Save our National Parks",
Atlantic Monthly, July, 1987, p.36.
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As there was never any consensus on how the Park
Service should best manage the parks, or what state the
parks should be in, early park directors looked to
precedents set by the United states Army and others who had
administered the park intermittently prior to 1916.

To

understand the early policies of the Park service, one must
first understand land management practices in the 1800's.
Early American's attitudes and actions with regard to land
use were to greatly influence early national park policies.
With firmly ingrained ideas toward land use that have
been retained over a century, the public has been quick in
modern history to criticize the Park Service should things
appear amiss.

While the early explorers and legislative

leaders are remembered as the bearers of the national park
"gift", the Park Service is often depicted as the spoilers
of it.

As the designated protectorate, they are

automatically assumed to be at fault.

But as a review of

history will prove, there have always been extraordinary
outside forces acting on the parks.

I will argue they are

found to be equally responsible for any preservation or
deterioration of our parklands.

As Wilbur R. Jacobs notes

in his treatise "Revising History with Ecology":
The destruction of our natural environment is usually
viewed as a great modern problem, the implication being that
only in the twentieth century has the onslaught taken place.
There is growing realization, however, that from the
beginning of history we Americans have been both destructive

14
and wasteful ... (of wildlands.) ... It is actually the scale
of the damage instead of its newness which forces us, though
still reluctantly, to confront the problem today.9
It is hoped this thesis will shed some light on the
history of American's attitudes toward parklands and how
these lands have subsequently been affected by public
policies.

The problems and prospects our national parks

face today are the direct result of over two hundred years
of man's interventions, attitudes, and political actions.
The Beginnings of Land Management in Colonial America
Americans have looked to "nature as proof of national
greatness" since the end of the American revolution.lo
Realizing their new nation did not have the rich traditions
of the British Empire, Americans had to seek out and extol
upon other assets.

The most obvious asset was the land.

Reveling in the beauty of it, early American's "reassured
themselves that they were destined for a grand and glorious
future in their own right."11
Prior to the Civil War, however, there was little
public concern to preserve or conservatively use land.
9Wilbur R. Jacobs, "Revising History with Ecology", ed.
Roderick Nash, Environment and Americans, (New York: Robert
E. Krieger Publishing co., 1979) p.84.
lOAlfred Runte, National Parks: The American
Experience, (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press,
1979) p.14.
llibid., p.14.
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Rather the early to mid-1800's was marked as a time of
territorial expansion. Americans "burned the forests ...
diverted rivers from their course or united them at their
pleasure" to shorten the "distances which separated the
North from the south and the East from the west."12

For

those moving west, the Homestead and Desert Acts promised a
share of public land to all those who could manage it.

With

the discovery of gold in Colorado, Wyoming, and California,
there emerged a time of rapid economic growth. The push to
the Oregon country by the Zionists, moreover, enhanced
western migration.

All of these factors added up to an

expansionist land policy.

A land policy that argued land

was to be conquered, not preserved.
Alexis de Tocqueville noted this expansionist sentiment
as he came across it in northern Michigan in 1831.

Finding

few in awe of wilderness, de Tocqueville decided that the
American vision was "fixed upon ... the march across these
wilds, draining swamps, turning the course of rivers,
peopling solitudes, and subduing nature."13

Yet, there were

a few anomalies to this attitude of development, notedly,
12Alan Tractenberg, "Progress and the Environment", as
cited in Roderick Nash, Environment and Americans: The
Problems of Priorities, (Santa Barbara: the University of
California, 1979) p.15.
13Alexis de Tocqueville as quoted in William c.
Everhart, The National Park service, (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1972) p.6.
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George Catlin.
In 1827, Catlin emersed himself in painting Niagara
Falls.

Noting the commercialism already marring the view,

he was later to propose setting aside a tract of this land
as a "Nation's Park, containing man and beast in all the
wildness and freshness of their natural beauty."14

Catlin's

sentiments were echoed by another early nature advocate:
Henry David Thoreau.

As Thoreau stated, "Why should not we,

who have renounced the King's authority have our national
reserves ... in which the bear and panther, and some of the
hunter race, may still exist, and not be civilized off the
face of the earth."15

Thoreau and Catlin's ideas regarding

land management and the conservation of natural resources,
however, were well ahead of their time.
The Reservation of Arkansas Hot Springs
In 1832, congress authorized the governor of Arkansas
to set aside the territory surrounding Arkansas' Hot Springs
so that they might always be publicly used.16

While the Act

set a precedent protecting geological features, the Hot
14Velma Linford, Wyoming: Frontier state, (Denver: The
Old West Publishing Company, 1947) p.258.
15Henry David Thoreau, "Chesuncook", Atlantic Monthy,
August, 1958, p.317.
16"An Act in relation to the Hot Springs Reservation in
Arkansas", as cited in Laws Relating to National Park
Service, p.221.
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Springs were reserved for their medicinal value and to avoid
a private monopoly rather than for aesthetic beauty.

The

Hot Springs Preservation Act "makes no mention of the
preservation of natural curiosities in their original state,
the protection of wildlife, (or) the public pleasuring
ground feature."17

The Act, thus, was not thought to be in

the same class as those later preserving national parks.
The two most frequented areas of scenic beauty in the
United states in the 1830's that most resembled the later
national parks were Niagara Falls in New York and Virginia's
Natural Bridge.

Thousands flocked to these places annually

to witness their unique beauty, albeit, there were no laws
formally protecting either of these geological wonders.18
Yosemite Park
After the Arkansas Reservation Act, it was not until
June 30, 1864 that congress again moved to reserve land for
public use.

Under the persuasion of senator John Conness

and American steamship Transit company owner Israel Raymond,
the federal government set aside a portion of Yosemite
Valley and Mariposa Redwood Tree Grove to be administered by
the state of California.19

The state was to have control of

17Jenks Cameron, The National Park Service, (New York:
D. Appleton and co., 1922) p.6.
18Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, p.26.
19Runte, National Parks: An American Experience, p.29.
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the Yosemite valley on the condition that it was to be held
for "public use, resort, and recreation ... for all time."20
The Yosemite Park Act is often thought to be the
precursor for later national park legislation.

It embodied

the first ideals of conservation and use for the benefit of
the people.

Yosemite Park also mirrored the later commonly

understood criteria for national parks.

Yosemite was set

aside for its incredibly beautiful valleys in the Sierras.
In fitting with the later national park criteria, the land
reserved in Yosemite was

"sublime" and "scenic" as based

solely on "direct human appreciation."21

The designated

boundary of Yosemite included only those scenic areas.
Thus, American's early "biological ignorance or
indifference" towards wilderness was depicted in this
delineation process.22
Shortly after the establishment of Yosemite Park, John
Muir arrived in the "range of light" and began writing a
series of articles on nature as he knew it.23

While they

20Laws Relating to National Park service, p.64.
21Ronald A. Foresta, America's National Parks and Their
Keepers, (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1984)
p. 3.

22Joseph Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, (Ann Arbor:
the University of Michigan Press, 1980) p.7.
23John Muir, Wilderness Essays, (Salt Lake City:
Peregrine Smith, Inc., 1980) p.xii.
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rapidly became in vogue as were Thoreau's collection of
essays and John Burrough's descriptions of flora and fauna,
their popularity hinged on descriptions of unusual and
incomprehensible forms in nature.

In the early 1800's, the

public was not drawn to nature by a mass concern for
ecological awareness.

Rather, Americans nationwide were

intrigued by descriptions of monumental forms of nature as
yet unknown to most on the East coast.
The Establishment of Yellowstone National Park
Monumentalism was found in plentitude by the first
exploration parties that discovered the Yellowstone region
in 1870.

While a trail of Indians, fur trappers, and

prospectors preceded the exploration party led by Henry
Washburn, Nathaniel Langford, and Gustaveous Doane, "it was
not until 1870 that the region was closely examined and its
wonders officially confirmed."24

The diaries of the

Washburn, Langford and Doane team members show that all were
continually-amazed at Yellowstone's unique hot springs,
geysers, waterfalls, and canyons.
During the nightly campfires of the expedition,
proposals were made by some of the members that they should
each buy quarter sections of Yellowstone, especially "those
that would eventually become a source of great prof it to the
24Ed., Donald E. Bowen, The Magnificent Refugee: crest
of a Continent, (New York: Wethesiane Books, 1972) p.261.
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owners".25

As history holds it, one member of this

expedition, a Judge by the name of Cornelius Hedges, had
another idea.

Judge Hedges was so impressed by what he saw

that he countered initial proposals and instead argued one
night, "there ought to be no private ownership of the
region ... The whole of it ought to be set aside as a great
national park.''26

The suggestion was met by "an

instantaneous and favorable response from all except one. 11 27
By the time the expedition emerged from this wildness they
were committed to the idea that this land should be kept
free from development.
Nathanial Langford noted in his diary during the trip,
"our purpose to create a park can only be accomplished by
untiring work and concerted action in a warfare against the
incredulity and unbelief of our national legislators."28
Yet, while the Washburn, Langford, and Doane expedition
emerged very much determined to create a park, Alfred Runte
argues in National Parks: An American Experience, that
25Nathanial Langford, as quoted by Harlean James,
Romance of the National Parks, (New York: Macrnillian
company,1941) p.13.
26Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, p.41.
27Nathanial Langford, as cited in Devereux Butcher,
Exploring Our National Parks and Monuments, (New York:
oxford University Press, 1947) p.76.
28Butcher, Exploring our National Parks and Monuments,
p.76.
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preservation and protection of the wildness for nature's
sake was not one of their goals.

As he notes, "Nathaniel

Langford's visions for Yellowstone Lake ... might well have
been inspired by Lake Como or the French Riviera. 'How can I
sum up this wonderful attraction!' he exclaimed. It is
dotted with islands of great beauty, as yet unvisited by
man, but which at no remote period will be adorned with
villas and the ornaments of civilized life. '"29
While Langford's intentions for Yellowstone may not be
as pure as some historians would have us remember, following
the end of the expedition, Langford immediately set out to
publicize the region.

Newspaper clips, lectures, and

magazine articles all conveyed the message brought by this
team that this was "probably the most remarkable region of
natural attractions in the world", and "should be ... set
aside as a public National Park."30
In the fall of 1871, the United states Geological
survey traversed the Yellowstone plateau to map and explore
the region.

This scientific team, lead by Dr. Ferdinand

Hayden included artist Thomas Moran and photographer,
William Henry Jackson.

With their help, Hayden's team was

29Runte, National Parks: An American Experience, p.43.
30Ed, New York Tribune, January 23, 1871, as cited in
Haines, Yellowstone National Park: Its Exploration and
Establishment, p.94.
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the first to extensively map and survey Yellowstone.

Their

resulting geologic records of this trip provided invaluable
insight into the unique Yellowstone plateau in later
Congressional hearings.

However, it was to be Thomas

Moran's paintings and Jackson's photographs of the scenery
that would convince Congress of the uniqueness of the
natural phenomena to be found there.
The Railroad Influence in the Creation of Yellowstone
By 1871, it had dawned on the Northern Pacific Railroad
that a Yellowstone park could potentially be a boon to rail
use.

Its remoteness meant the Northern Pacific would hold

practically a monopoly on tourist transportation to the
area.

On October 27, Dr. Hayden received a letter from a

Northern Pacific Railroad employee, A.B. Nettleton, who
pleaded: "Let Congress pass a bill reserving the Great
Geyser Basin as a public park forever--just as it has
removed that far inferior wonder the Yosemite Valley and big
trees."31

The letter was written on the stationary of "Jay

Cooke and co., Bankers, Financial Agents, Northern Pacific
Railroad company."32
The Northern Pacific Railroad moved to sponsor Nathanial
31Aubrey Haines, Yellowstone National Park: Its
Exploration and Establishment, (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1974) p.109.
32Ibid.
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Langford travels on the lecture circuit in 1871, selling the
national park idea to the American public.

Langford

extolled upon the magnificent scenery in his public speeches
which "appealed to a tenacious American desire to measure up
to European civilization."33

Yet, he also yielded to more

puritan Americans by noting Yellowstone's uselessness to
agriculture, mining or manufacturing purposes.

The

"remoteness" of Yellowstone "also assured, by in large, that
(it) had little economic value."34
Langford met with Montana Territorial Representative
William Claggett in the winter of 1871-72, who with the help
of Dr. Hayden, drew up a bill to set aside the Yellowstone
region.

Representative Claggett first introduced this

legislation to the House on December 18, 1871.

Senator

Pomeroy introduced it in the senate.
As the bill was heard in the senate Committee on Public
Lands, Pomeroy also emphasized the unsuitable Yellowstone
environment~

As he noted, "there are no arable lands, no

agricultural lands there.

It is the highest elevation from

which our springs descend, and as it cannot interfere with
any settlement for legitimate agricultural purposes, it was

33Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.9.
34Ibid.
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thought it ought to be set aside."35

Dr. Hayden assured the

senators that the land was totally worthless.

Expedition

team leader Gustaveous Doane took the stance on the stand
that while it was worthless land, it did have great
scientific value.

As he stated, "in the branches of

geology, mineralogy, botany, zoology, and ornithology, it is
probably the greatest laboratory that nature furnishes on
the surface of the globe."36
While, it is thought that the Northern Pacific "greased
the wheel" a little for legislative approval, the
Yellowstone Park bill was approved by the Senate on January
30, 1872.37

Yet, a number of Montanans remained unconvinced

this was a positive step for Yellowstone.

As the editor of

the Helena Daily Herald noted, "without a doubt the Northern
Pacific Railroad will have a branch track penetrating this
Plutonian region, and few seasons will pass before excursion
trains will daily be sweeping into this great park thousands
of the curios from all parts of the world."38

Anyone

35Haines, Yellowstone National Park: Its Exploration
and Establishment, p.117.
36William c. Everhart, The National Park Service, (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1972) p.8.
37Craig Allen, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation,
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982) p.28.
38Ed., "A National Park", Helena Daily Herald, January
31, 1872.
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desiring to see it in a more pristine state, he advised,
should come immediately.
others regarded the project with little favor because
they were concerned that congress would not "open roads or
hostelries" in Yellowstone, leaving it inaccessible to the
great mass of travelers."39

As a petition appearing in the

Rocky Mountain Weekly Gazette stated, "we are opposed to any
scheme which will have a tendency to remand (Yellowstone)
into perpetual solitude by shutting out private
enterprise."40

Thus, were recorded some of the first public

arguments regarding preservation in tandem with use.
On February 27, the national park legislation passed in
the House 115-65 and on March 1, 1872 it was signed into law
by President Grant.

The act itself was billed as being

inherently democratic.

By setting aside a tract of land for

the benefit and enjoyment of all, it ensured that
Yellowstone's wonders would not be controlled by a wealthy
few.

As senator Trumbull assured, with a national park no

one could "plant himself right along the path that leads to
these wonders and charge every man that passes along ... a

39Ed. "The National Park--Memorial to congress", Helena
Daily Herald, February 3, 1872.
40Ed., "The National Park--A Memorial to Congress'',
Helena Daily Herald, February 3, 1872.
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fee of one to five dollars."41

In the eyes of the majority

of congressional officials, however, the land was set aside
with the understanding that it was inherently "worthless"
and that it would require no congressional appropriations to
be maintained.42
Americans understanding of the national park concept
as it was conceived in the Yellowstone Act was broad and
varied.

Yet, the loosely written act could be interpreted

to provide something for everyone.

some looked to

Yellowstone as a "valuable resort for a certain class of
invalids".43

Others hoped its conservation clause would

pave the way for the "rescue" of the Niagara "from its
present degrading surroundings" in a similar manner.44

It

emerged rather to suit a "happy convergence of many
disparate interests."45
In Mountains Without Handrails, Joseph sax argues, that
"the modern desire to view "the first national park" as the
41Senator Trubull, as cited by Fred B. Eiseman, "Who
Runs the Grand canyon", Natural History, March, 1978, p.83.
42Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.9.
43Ed. "The Yellowstone Park Bill", New York Times,
February 29, 1872, p.4.
44Excerpt from The Nation, March 7, 1872, p.153 as
cited in Haines, Yellowstone National Park : Its Exploration
and Establishment, p.128.
45Joseph Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.11.
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product of (an early) public ecological conscience has
little history to support it."46

certainly this is the case

with Yellowstone and a number of the other early parklands
to follow.

When the boundaries of Yellowstone National Park

were carved out by Hayden and Langford, no thought was given
as to the boundaries of its ecosystem.

Rather, "the

enormous size of the Yellowstone reservation ... (was)
largely to avoid missing any wonders not yet discovered
which might exist in the same general area."47 Yellowstone
was undoubtedly set aside strictly for its unique thermal
features.

Interest in them being more indicative of

America's "fascination with monumentalism" rather than any
concern for biology.48
Yellowstone National Park was created in a time in our
nation's history when the West had yet to be fully explored.
Montana, Wyoming, and Idaho, the three territories that
Yellowstone's boundaries were carved out of, were not even
admitted to·the union.
in this region.

Indian wars were still being fought

The idea that the park was set aside at

that time strictly as a wilderness preserve, thus, is
inconceivable.
46Ibid., p. 7.
47Craig Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation,
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982) p.28.
48Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.7.
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Park Management
In the early years, the only access to Yellowstone was
by stage via roads running from Montana's southern border
into the park.

The first few handfuls of tourists in

Yellowstone in its formative years, thus, were Montana
residents.

The primary reason they came to Yellowstone was

the hot mineral baths.

Bathhouses, offering cleansing

thermal waters and medicinal cures were provided in
abundance by early concessionaires.

Locals, such as James

Mccarthy and Uncle Jim Yancy, also provided accommodations
for these visitors as approved by the Secretary of the
Interior.49
Nathanial Langford was appointed to be the park's first
superintendent shortly after Yellowstone was set aside in
1872.

But, because Congress had been promised they would

spend "not one cent for scenery", they never appropriated a
salary for him.50

Moreover, Langford had no legal authority

to make and ·enforce laws to protect the park.

These

limitations were eventually to force him to return home to
Minnesota.

Records show Langford was only in the park twice

during his five year stint as Superintendent.
The absentee landlord management policy found in
49Dyan Zaslowsky, The Black Calvary of Commerce, p.27.
50Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.10.
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Yellowstone during its formative years offered a whole new
set of problems for the park.

Squatters "moved in and

vandals and poachers preyed on its natural wealth."51

The

few adventurous tourists who came into the park were often
seen with "shovel and axe, chopping and hacking and prying
up great pieces of the most ornamental work they could
find."52

Yet, no one seemed to care.

Complacency among

Congressmen and others was a result of the predominant
understanding that held land could not be permanently
disfigured.

This was especially true in an area as vast as

Yellowstone Park.
Langford was relieved of his superintendent duties in
April, 1877 and replaced by Philetus

w.

Norris.

Norris was

provided with a salary and annual appropriations "to
protect, preserve, and improve the Park".53

While he had

no more authority than Langford to enforce law within the
park, at least with the allotment of funding he was able to
approve construction of buildings and hire a "gamekeeper" to
prevent poaching of the animals.

Norris was thought to have

been a great asset to Yellowstone as Superintendent, yet, he
made one unfortunate mistake.

As he choose to name hundreds

51Clary, The Place Where Hell Bubbled Up, p.33.
52Ibid.
53Ibid.

I

p.36.
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of thermal features, roadways, and mountains after himself
and his family, a few prominent Montanans became concerned
he was taking over Yellowstone and used their clout to
convince congress to remove him in February 1882.
With the removal of Superintendent Norris, Yellowstone
witnessed a series of weak superintendents during the mid
1880's.

As none of these superintendents had the gumption

to stand up and fight for the park, it left the land
extremely vulnerable to spoilation.

Especially as during

this same time, the park was experiencing its first real
boon in tourism.

With the completion of the Northern

Pacific Rail line into Gardiner, Montana, over five hundred
visitors were arriving annually by rail.

The railroads

offered packaged tours so that travelers could see many of
the park's primary attractions as part of their ticket
package.

The railroads also helped to set up stage coach

companies and subsidized the construction of lodging
facilities inside the park to improve guests stay.S4

Yet,

as their money came from tourists, neither the railway lines
or the concessionaires assumed the role of protectorates of
the environment.

Guests came first.SS

It was thought the

beauty of Yellowstone would exist in perpetuity.
S4Zawslowsky, The Black Calvary of Commerce, p.29.
SSClary, The Place Where Hell Bubbled Up, p.Sl.
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While the park's interior was threatened by unregulated
visitor use during the 1880's, forces in Washington seemed
determined to legally revise the national park idea to its
detriment as well.

Northern Pacific railroad owners were

continually exerting their influence in congress to run a
line through the northern section of the park.

The

legislative sponsor noted he could not fathom "the sentiment
which favors the retention of a few buff alos to the
development of mining interests."56

While mining had been

prohibited in the initial legislation protecting
Yellowstone, it was hoped this clause would be reversed.

In

the meantime, the railroad's "right of way" bill was toted
as a means of bring the park to the people, yet, it was also
seen as a measure "inspired by corporate greed and natural
selfishness."57

on December 14, 1886, this measure was

defeated in the House 107-65.

Allin argues in The Politics

of Wilderness Preservation that this preservation success
was primarily brought about because "the slaughter of
buffalo had been on such a magnificent scale that it
must ... have been recognized as a conservation crisis before
the exhaustibility of most other resources was apparent."58
56United states Congress, "The congressional Record",
18 (December 14, 1886) p.150-151 as cited by Allin, The
Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.32.
57Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.32.
58Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.55.

32
To combat apparent management problems, congress moved
to make some changes in the park's administration.
Beginning in 1883, the civil superintendents were allowed to
remain and each was to hire ten assistants.

However, the

duties of protecting the park and developing roadways were
reassigned to the Army.

While they still had no formal

authority to enforce law within the park, the secretary of
the Interior at least could request the use of troops from
the secretary of War.
The Army's role in Yellowstone was to "prevent
trespassing or intruders from entering the park for the
purpose of destroying the game or objects of curiosity."59
When congress failed to appropriate any money for the park
in 1885, the secretary of the Interior appealed to the War
secretary for troops to take over park administration in its
entirety.

While the secretary of the Interior remained the

Chief Park protectorate, the Army would regulate and enforce
laws in the ·parks.

The commander of troops was eventually

to become "the acting superintendent''.60

In this fashion,

the Army was to administer Yellowstone between 1886 and 1916
before the Park Service was established.
59"An Act making appropriations for sundry civil
expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1884 11 , as cited in Laws Relating to the National Park
Service, p.27.
60Cameron, The National Park service, p.34.
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The Army in Yellowstone
On August 17, 1886, Captain Moses Harris lead fifty men
in to the park to begin their duties as park managers.

one

of their first tasks was to put out forest fires which had
been burning for the "greater portion" of the summer
season.61

They also moved to oversee concession operations

and create the first visible system of law and order.

The

Army curtailed the cutting of live trees, enforced the ban
on hunting or trapping of the wildlife, and stopped
trespassing and squatting.

It was to be "enjoined upon all

soldiers to be vigilant and attentive in the enforcement of
the foregoing regulations ... They were not "to hesitate to
make arrests when necessary", although they had little
recourse for action once they did.62
In the eyes of the early concessionaires and tourists,
the army officers were seen as being kind, courteous, and an
overall asset to the park.

They rapidly moved to fill

informal duties as that of trail crew and tour guide as well
as being general law enforcement officers.

Yet, the Army

neither had any sense of ecology or wildlife conservation.
In fitting with Americas nineteenth century attitude that
61Aubrey Haines, The Yellowstone Story, Vol.II,
(Colorado: Colorado Associated University Press, 1977) p.4.
62H. Duane Hampton, How the United states cavalry saved
our National Parks, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1971) p.83.
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wildness was unlimited, they proceeded to kill animals in
the park thought to be a detriment to the tourists.

It was

primarily the mountain lion, cougar, bison, and wolf that
were thought to be "bad" animals in the park and the Army
attempted to kill them all.
It is important to note that the united states Army
officers in Yellowstone were not hard headed utilitarians.
Rather, they ordered the slaughter of animals and allowed
logging in the park as they truly believed Yellowstone to be
an unlimited wilderness.

There was no conceivable way man

could destroy wilderness because there was just too much of
it.

Moreover, the puritan ethic held fast even in the late

nineteenth century that "generally held altruism and
aestheticism in disdain."63
philosophy.

The Army acted on this

While it might contradict modern philosophies

of conservation or preservation of natural resources, it can
be argued nevertheless, in the late 1800's, military
management "saved the National park idea".64
The Establishment of other Early National Parks
As the United States Army moved to improve Yellowstone
and the park ideal in eyes of the public and congressional
officials, it paved the way for the establishment of other
63Hampton, How the United states Calvary saved our
National Parks, p.4.
64Ibid., p.5.
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national parks. By 1890, Yosemite's status was changed from
that of a state park to a national park and the land was
reverted to federal ownership.

In the same year, Sequoia

and General Grant (now known as Kings canyon) national parks
were established.65

In 1899, Mt. Ranier national park was

created. Most of these new parks were established as a
result of "local action led by a few concerned individuals
to prevent despoiling. 66
11

New parks were not thought of as

being part of a system of national parks.

Their protective

legislation was basically worded in the same manner as was
Yellowstone's and all fell under the jurisdiction of the
Department of the Interior.

Albeit, all parks were

independently administered.

until the creation of the

National Park Service in 1916, the history of the national
parks was "a history of individual parks rather than group
development."67
The conservation Era
While the national park idea was gaining increasing
acceptance among Americans by 1890, there was evidence as
well that they were reassessing their attitude toward land
65Ronald A. Foresta, America's National Parks and their
Keepers, (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1984)
p.16.
66Everhart, The National Park Service, p.9.
67Jenks Cameron, The National Park service, Monograph #
11, (New York: D. Appleton and co., 1922) p.8.
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use.

As more and more people were able to travel to

Yosemite and Yellowstone by rail, they became aware of the
beauty of the country.

At the same time many at home were

becoming aware of waste and mismanagement of land within
their own townships.

The striking blow came with the 1890

census as it "sounded America's earliest environmental
warning, announcing for the first time in history the
country no longer had a frontier."68

As the frontier had

long symbolized "abundance and prosperity", the public
responded with an unprecedented concern for natural
resources.69

Environmental awareness groups, such as the

Sierra Club and the Appalachian Mountain Club took root and
prospered. support for the environment also came from the
business community, garden clubs, and scientists.
With a growing concern for the environment came a
growing acceptance in America of national parks, especially
among the middle class.

The idea of public park ownership

"fit into a ·homogeneous, universal notion of the public
good; all Americans, regardless of class and region would
become the beneficiaries of its bounty."70

As the rail and

tent camps, such as Wylie Way, made parks accessible to the
68Everhart, The National Park service, p.13.
69Everhart, The National Park Service, p.13.
p.14.

70Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
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middle class, visitation soared.

In Yellowstone visitation

increased from 5,438 in 1895 to 9,579 in 1899.71

As John

Muir noted in 1898:
Thousands of nerve-shaken, overcivilized people are
beginning to find out that going to the mountains is going
home; that wildness is a necessity; and that mountain parks
and reservations are useful not only as fountains of timber
and irrigating rivers, but as fountains of life.72
To Americans' in the late 1800's, parks were for people.
Two important pieces of legislation were enacted by
Congress in the 1890's that were to have a great impact on
parklands.

The first, known as the "Lacey Act", gave the

secretary of Interior and those under him the legal
authority to enforce laws in Yellowstone.

Under this act,

the Park was mandated to be part of the United States
judicial district of Wyoming.

Regulations set by the

secretary of the Interior would be punishable by law and the
laws of the state of Wyoming would be applicable
otherwise.73
In addition, the ''Lacey Act" declared that
"hunting, ... killing, wounding, or capturing at any time of
any bird or wild animal, except dangerous animals, when it
71Henry Finck, "Yellowstone Park as a summer Resort",
The Nation, September, 1900, p.248.
72Freedman Tilden, The National Parks: What They Mean
To You and Me, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951) p.19.
73Hampton, How the United States Calvary saved our
National Parks, p.125.
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is necessary to prevent them from destroying human life or
inflicting injury", would be prohibited.74

This passage was

extraordinarily important as it provided unprecedented
protection for wildlife.

It was thus recognized that

wildlife in the parks had value as did unique thermal
features, rock formations or mountains.

Wildlife would no

longer exist simply to feed the guests.

Yet, the Act also

made allowances for fishing, leaving the Secretary of
Interior to set concrete stipulations.

Fishing was much too

popular a sport to eliminate.
The second piece of legislation that was to have a
tremendous influence on the parks was a provision
designating forest reserves, later known as national
forests.

The provision itself was actually attached to a

much larger sundry Civil bill so it was never subject to
debate.75

However, this inconsequential rider provided the

President with the unprecedented authority to set aside
large sections of public lands to be protected for their
timber.76

Almost immediately, President Harrison

established the Shoshone Forest Reserve, setting aside 1.25
74An Act to Protect the birds and animals in
Yellowstone National Park, and to punish said crimes in said
park, and for other purposes as cited in Laws Relating to
the National Park service, p.30.
75Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.34.
76Ibid.
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million acres buttressing Yellowstone Park.77
In 1897, Congress also moved to provide for "the
management" of these forest reserves so that the timber
would not be destroyed.78

subsequently, the Forest Service

was created and Gifford Pinochet became the first Chief of
the Division of Forestry. Pinochet was a great advocate of
land use and national forests were quick to be labeled
"lands of many uses".79

Yet, use of forestland would become

an issue of concern for national park advocates as forests
were primarily located next to parklands.

As national

forests provided a vital buffer zone between parklands and
developed areas, they would later become of vital importance
to park managers.
The Conservation Movement Continued

1900-1910

The two greatest lobbyists for the conservation
movement by the early 1900's were thought to be President
Theodore Roosevelt and Chief of Forestry Gifford Pinochet.
While they worked diligently to promote the idea of land
conservation by pushing congress to set aside more and more
federal lands, there was no consensus how these lands should
be managed or what "conservation" meant.

Many people,

77Ibid.
78Hans Huth, Nature and the American, (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1972) p.177.
79Motto of the United states Forest Service.
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especially westerners were still "apt to dismiss
conservation as an artificial concept tinged with Eastern
romantic and humanitarian notions."80

They labeled

conservationists as "nature lovers or socialist
planners."81

Yet, to those in tune with the environmental

awareness movement for the most part, the notion of
conservation had less radical overtones.

"Conservation'',

was merely the notion that natural resources should be used
more wisely.
Between the years 1900-1910, the conservation movement
along with the influence of President Roosevelt assured the
addition of parklands.

Six national parks were created

during this period in time: crater Lake in Oregon, Wind cave
in South Dakota, Sully's Hill in south Dakota, Platt in
Oklahoma, Mesa Verde in Colorado, and Glacier in Montana.82
All establishing acts for the parks were similar to that of
Yelllowstone's.
During -this same time period, congress also passed an
Act for the preservation of American Antiquities in 1906.
This Act gave the President the unprecedented authority to
80Arthur A. Ekirich, Man and Nature in America, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1963) p.81.
81Ekirch, Man and Nature in America, p.82.
p.12.

82Foresta, America's National Parks and their Keepers,
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set aside lands as national monuments which he deemed to
have ''historic or prehistoric interest."83

Beginning with

Devil's Tower in Wyoming and the Petrified Forest in
Arizona, President Roosevelt was quick to set aside sixteen
other national monuments during his adrninistration.84
Management of these areas was split with the Department of
Agriculture, administering the national monument status
battle fields; while the Departments of war and Interior
shared responsibilities for the monuments of natural
significance.

Yet, problems with this divided management

policy were many.

As it was noted, "under existing

conditions two departments were charged with jurisdiction
over national monuments, and three may be.
is divided.

Responsibility

There can be no uniformity on administration

unless there is uniformity in letting the monuments
alone."85
Between 1900-10, this same haphazard federal land
management style was prevalent throughout the parklands as
well.

All parks continued to be managed independently.

While some of the parks were graced with the presence of the
83James, Romance of the National Parks, p.68.
84Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, p.72.
85Report of the Director of the National Park service
to the Secretary of the Interior, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, June 30, 1917) p.6.
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Army and the corp of Engineers, others were managed by the
Secretary of the Interior with the help of forestry
officials.

Problems with the forestry professionals in the

parks, however, was to come to a head within the first
decade.

Goals for the parklands differed between the

Forest service under Pinochet and the Interior department in
tandem with other conservationists, such as John Muir and
his Sierra Club.

For Muir and others, reserved parklands

were to be sanctuaries of nature, entirely left in their
natural state as a contrast to the state of society.

To

Pinochet, the goal of conservation was "development."86
In 1908, President Roosevelt called a Conservation
Conference of Governors to discuss the conservation of
reserved lands and ways they could be better managed.

While

this conference was led by Pinochet, the most influential
speaker appeared to be Dr. Horace McFarland, President of
the American Civic Association.

In contrast to Pinochet's

utilitarian philosophy toward park management, McFarland
pushed instead for better park protection. As he noted,
the national parks, all too few in number ... ought to
be held absolutely inviolate by congress ... The scenic value
of (land) ... should be jealously guarded as a distinctly
important national resource, and not as a mere incidental
increment.87
86Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.14.
87James, Romance of the National Parks, p.69.
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Arguing for the creation of a national bureau, he stated,
Nowhere in Washington can an inquirer find an off ice of
the national parks, or a desk devoted solely to their
management. By passing around through three departments, and
consulting clerks who have taken on the extra work of doing
what they can for the nation's playgrounds, it is possible
to come at little information.BB
After the conference, Dr. McFarland began to campaign in
earnest for the establishment of a single agency to manage
the national parks.

He found support for his idea from

those in the Sierra Club who in 1910 "took up the cause ...
and appointed a special promotion committee to advance the
idea."B9

By 1911, with their help, it was clear he had won

the support of a great number of public interest groups.
By 1912, national park conferences were being organized
by these public interest groups to discuss how parks should
be managed.

Also for the first time in 1911 and 1912, the

national park superintendents and officers from the
Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and War convened in
Yellowstone and Yosemite respectively to discuss park
management.

It was the Superintendents' goal to bring about

improvements that would lead to greater park control by the
Department of the Interior.90
BBibid., p.72.
B9Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.17.
90Cameron, The National Park Service, p.9.
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on February 12, 1812, President Taft sent a request to
congress asking them to create a Bureau of National Parks.
such a bureau for parks was ''essential", he stated, as
"everyone recognizes the obligations of the Government to
preserve them for the edification and recreation of the
people."91

While legislation was introduced in 1812,

nothing ever became of it in the Sixty-second Congress.
In 1913, however, the dream of a single agency
administering the parks began to hold more promise.

For

one, a new secretary of the Interior came on board, Franklin
K. Lane, who was eager to establish a National Park service
to be placed under the authority of the Department of the
Interior.

Yet, legislation for the National Park service,

even with the support of Secretary Lane, did not win the
support of the Sixty-third congress.92
The Hetch-Hetchy Controversy
While Congress did not see fit to create a National
Park Service in 1913 they did move, however, on December 19,
1913 to allow "the city of San Francisco the right to use
certain lands in the Yosemite Park, specifically the Hetch
Hetchy Valley, for the construction of a reservoir to supply
the city with water and to generate electric power."93
91James, Romance of the National Parks, p.73.
92James, Romance of the National Parks, p.75.
93Cameron, The National Park service, p.10.
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was an "exceptional case'' and even considered to be a
radical act in its own time as it provided for unprecedented
industrial use of parkland.94

Albeit, the damming of the

Hetch Hetchy valley had a long history, even longer than the
history of Yosemite National Park.
Citizens of San Francisco had considered damming Hetch
Hetchy Valley since 1882, however, they had never before
been able to simultaneously gain local, state, and federal
permission.

once Yosemite had become a national park in

1899, the Valley legally was restricted from such
development, but that did not stop developers from moving to
fight.

Developers since the turn of the century had sought

to elect a mayor in San Francisco with the same utilitarian
philosophy and attitude toward Hetch Hetchy.

In 1907, they

found one in Mayor James Garfield, a good friend of Gifford
Pinochet.

Garfield pushed the Hetch Hetchy dam proposal to

approval in San Francisco and then took it to Congress.
In congressional hearings over Hetch Hetchy valley,
Forestry Chief Pinochet set the tone as he stated, "the
fundamental principle of the whole conservation policy is
that of use, to take every part of the land and its
resources and put it to that use in which it will best serve

94Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.9.
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the most people."95

Pinochet promised any assistance

necessary to see it to completion.

The dam was entirely in

fitting with his "conservationist" or utilitarian philosophy
regarding land use.

In opposition, John Muir appealed to

Congress in arguing: "Dam Hatch Hetchy?

As well dam for

water-tanks the people's cathedrals and churches, for no
holier temple has ever been consecrated by the heart of
man. "96
In the end, the utilitarians lobbying in congress
clearly won any debate on Hetch Hetchy, mostly owing to
circumstance and the understanding of "conservation'' at the
time.

Looking ahead to the future, many Congressmen were

convinced San Francisco's potential domestic water supply
was at stake.

Even as people revered their parklands, their

"spiritual attachment to untrammed nature" was not as great
as their "commitment to economic progress."97

None of the

eleven California congressional officials opposed the
damming of the Hetch Hetchy valley.

As the chairman of the

House Public Lands committee noted;
When it comes to weighing the highest conservation, on
the one hand, of water for domestic use against the
95Roderick Nash, The call of the Wild, (New York:
George Braziller, 1970) p.86.
96John Muir, The Yosemite, (New York: The Century
company, 1912) p.261.
97Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.10.
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preservation of a rocky, scraggly canyon, allowing 200,000
gallons of water daily to run idly to the sea, doing no one
any good, there is nothing that will appeal to a thoughtful
brain of a commonsense, practical man.98
Thus, the Act was passed and the dam was built, albeit,
almost immediately, some came to regret it.
The Establishment of a National Park service
While the approval of the Hetch Hetchy dam was lauded
by many, it was also equally devastating to others,
especially to those "conservationist", or "preservationist"
Sierra Clubers who had actively fought the dam proposal for
fifteen years.99

The damming of the Hetch Hetchy valley was

to be an irrevocable loss of scenic beauty in the Sierra
highlands.

As John Muir was to write, "some sort of

compensation must surely come out of this dark damn-damdamnation."100
Initially, the dam act was to jolt public awareness
that parklands were not being held in perpetuity as their
establishing acts would suggest.

More importantly, however,

the damming of the Hetch Hetchy valley renewed with vigor a
national fight to establish a National Park service.

In the

damming of the Hatch Hetchy, some influential parties were
98Everhart, The National Park Service, p.16.
99Ibid.

I

p. 16.

lOOAllin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation,
p. 47.
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finally convinced of the need for an administrative agency
for the parks.
While the secretary of the Interior Lane had initially
supported the Yosemite park dam, in 1914, he was to admit
that it was a mistake.

It is believed "he was committed to

the cession of the Hetch Hetchy valley ... as a reward to
California for giving its vote to Wilson."101

Determined to

make amends, Lane renewed his efforts to gain a separate
bureau for the parks.
In December of 1914, Lane appointed a new Assistant
secretary, Stephen Tyng Mather, whose sole job initially was
to garner support for the establishment of a national park
service.102

Mather devoted the entire year of 1915 to

selling influential railroad owners, writers, lawyers and
congressman on the idea of a National Park Service.

He

sponsored and personally financed numerous first class
excursions through the parks for these gentleman. As it was
noted, Mather's "enthusiasm, public spirit, and
generosity" ... (gave him) ''friends in every direction, and
especially in congress.

The stage was set for action and

101Huth, Nature and the American, p.196.
102Horace M. Albright, The Birth of the National Park
service, p.24.
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results."103
State of the Parks -- 1915
In 1915, 334,799 visitors were reported to have entered
the fourteen existing national parks.104

The Army had done

a good job of providing law enforcement and interpretive
services over the years, yet, troops in the parks were
expensive to maintain.

In 1915, it was estimated that

military management in Yellowstone alone cost the goverment
$194,193.49.

Costs of establishing and maintaining a

civilian force it was figured would cost half as much.105
President Wilson was concerned, moreover, there were not
enough men in the Army even during a time of peace to
divided some among the parks.
As the primary managers in the parks for the past
thirty years, the Army had done a commendable job overseeing
concessions, building roads and bridges, while dealing with
the continuing problems of illegal poaching and hunting.
Yet, even with their hard work, the parks still lacked many
necessary facilities and access routes to accommodate the
increasing numbers of visitors.

While the use of

103Horace Albright as cited in James, Romance of the
National Parks, p.77.
104Stephen T. Mather, "A Glance Backward at National
Park Development", Nature Magazine, August, 1927, p.112.
105Hampton, How the United Stated Calvary saved our
National Parks, p.178.
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automobiles was first sanctioned in many park areas in
1915, many of the initial stage coach roads simply could
not accommodate them.
Another monumental problem to be reckoned with in the
parks in 1915 was the existence of private lands within many
national park boundaries.

With the exception of Yellowstone

and Arkansas Hot Springs, many plots of land within park
areas had been developed prior to their reservation.

There

were no Congressional appropriations to secure these plots,
thus, leaving private land owners free to do as they wished
with their property.106
The Creation of the National Park Service
In the spring of 1916, Congressman William Kent, "a man
with good credentials among both wise-use conservatives and
preservationists", introduced a bill establishing a National
Park service, as did congressman John Raker.107

Senator

Reese introduced similar legislation in the senate.

With

the Hatch Hetchy Act controversy still shadowing Congress,
it was time to move forward.

The House bills were first

addressed in hearings of the committee on Public Lands in
April and it quickly became clear to those present that the
106Hather, "A Glance Backward at National Park
Development", p.115.
p.49.

107Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation,
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Kent proposal carried the momentum.
In hearings, the financial rewards to be reaped from
the park lands were the prime selling point for the
establishment of a Park Service.

As Agricultural secretary

Fisher opened the hearing on the Park service bill before
the House Public Lands Committee, he stated, "we should try
to make our people spend their money in this country instead
of abroad, and certainly as far as spending it abroad for
the scenic effect."108

Mather took the stand at the

hearings as the representative for the Department of the
Interior and also gave his support for the Kent bill.

As he

stated, "our national parks are practically lying fallow,
and only await proper development to bring them into their
own."109

In addition, Dr. McFarland also testified as a

contributor to the Kent bill.
practical.

As he noted, parks were

Parks enabled men to be challenged in a

different manner than work.

Parks would promote "service

and efficiency ... (rather than) pleasure and
ornamentation."110
The most important passage from the Kent legislation, as
McFarland noted, was taken from an earlier writing of
108Runte, National Parks: The American Experience,
p.100.
109Ibid., p.103.
llOibid., p.101.
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Frederick Olmsted, Jr. It stated:
The fundamental object of these aforesaid parks,
monuments, and reservations is to conserve the scenery and
the natural and historical objects therein and to provide
for the enjoyment of said scenery and objects by the public
in a manner and by any means that will leave them unimpaired
for the enjoyment of future generations.111
This initially noncontroversial statement was to become the
statement of purpose for the National Park Service (NPS).
Support for the NPS bill could be found in the
Departments of the Interior, and Agriculture, numerous
environmental organizations, the American Civic Association,
and railroad owners.112

It seemed this broadly written

piece of legislation offered something for everyone.

The

avowed "preservationists" organizations supported the Park
Service act as it promised to conserve the scenery.

The

utilitarian railroad owners supported it in their thinking
that a Park Service would ensure scenic areas were be
maintained for their rail tours.
consideration: war.

Another factor of

The United States would almost

certainly become involved in world war I.

It was

considered by many to be only a matter of time before the
troops in the parks would have to be removed.
The Kent bill establishing the National Park Service
lllJames, Romance of the National Parks, p.76.
112Runte, National Parks: The American Experience,
p.101.
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{NPS) was passed by Congress on August 25, 1916 and signed
into law by President Wilson.

Overnight, the National Park

Service became the ninth bureau in the Department of the
Interior and the overseer of 14 national parks and 22
national monuments encompassing over six million acres.113
To manage these properties, NPS was to hire a Secretary, an
assistant director, a chief clerk, a draftsman and any other
employees the Secretary of the Interior deemed necessary.114
The secretary of the Interior also was granted the final
authority to "make and publish such rules and regulations as
he may deem necessary ... for the use and management of the
parks".115
In congress, the only firm understanding as to how
parks should be managed could be summed up in one word:
profitably.116

There was no consensus exactly how these

parks and monuments should be managed with respect to flora
and fauna.

No congressional official was an expert on land

113At this time NPS only assumed responsibility for the
national monuments ~lready under the jurisdiction of the
Department of the Interior.
114"An Act to establish a National Park Service and for
other purposes approved August 25, 1916 as cited in Laws
Relating to National Park Service, p.9.
115An Act to establish a National Park Service and for
other purposes approved August 25, 1916 as cited in Laws
Relating to National Park Service, p.10.
116Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.11.
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management.

Moreover, land management, especially relating

to parklands, was not a high priority.

Secretary Lane had

their trust and they were satisfied to leave those details
to him.

There was also widespread confidence that NPS was

in good hands under the directorship of Stephen Mather.
For conservationists, the establishment of NPS cemented
the legitimacy of the parks and provided for a centralized
decision-making agency.

Prior to this act, any park

superintendent's efforts to correlate "methods of management
was impossible ... (Moreover,) ... the supervisory officers in
Washington could only give the parks incidental
attention."117

For railroad owners, it was hoped with NPS

help, parks could be made more profitable.

The

environmental groups, on the other hand, finally had a
promise from the federal government that the scenery would
be protected or "conserved."

As they were soon to be

reminded, however, the term "conservation" meant many things
to many people.

117Department of the Interior, "Report of the Director
of the Park service to the Secretary of the Interior",
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917) p.3.
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Chapter II
While the National Park Service Act was approved on
August 25, 1916, congress failed to appropriate funds
towards its establishment until April, 17, 1917.1

At that

time, Stephen Mather was named Director of the Park service.
Horace M. Albright became Assistant Director.

Together,

these two men almost singlehandedly determined the direction
of the Park Service for the next two critical decades.

They

saw NPS through a "time of rapid growth and development"
despite world War I and the Great Depression.2

Yet, even as

they moved to bring tourists to the parks and enlarge the
park system, they established a policy of prudent
development as known in their time and set a precedent for
all to follow.
The Mather Years 1917-28
In 1917, Mather and Albright had a formidable task
ahead of them with regard to problems within the parks and
the park system.

Within the original parks, there was no

"integrated planning in the construction of new buildings,
camps, villages, entrance roads, and trails."3

While cars

lReport of the Director of the Park Service to the
secretary of the Interior, 1917, p.1.
2Everhart, The National Park service, p.23.
3Albright, The Birth of the National Park Service,
p. 104.
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had recently been permitted in the parks, few park roads
were able to accommodate them.

This left the Park service

faced with inadequate facilities, irate tourists, and
automobile clubs who were quick to protest the
inaccessibility of many areas.
Mather and Albright also were faced with the growing
problem of private land ownership within the park
boundaries.

Among these private land owners, there seemed

to be a pervasive general disregard for park management and
lack of understanding of conservation.

In 1917, there were

simply no funds available to begin to buy these individual
tracts of land.
The greatest problem appeared to be the lack of any
semblance of a park system.

Each park was operating

independently, often swaying to local political interests or
concessionaires pressures.

Prior to 1917, there were no

formal rules for park management, only an establishing act
and a string of mandates issued by various Army Corps and
other groups.

While the Army had set about to establish

some form of park management, policies ranged widely between
the parks, often to the detriment of the wildlands and
wildlife.
The 1918 Policy Directive
To combat these problems, the first task Mather and
Albright undertook was to build an effective organization

L __________________________ _
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and establish a set of bylaws for the parks.

In 1918

secretary Lane formally issued a policy directive to Mather
which addressed twenty three specific references as to how
parks should be managed.

This letter, "commonly believed to

have be written by Mather himself, was a concise expression
of Mather's management philosophy."4 (See Appendix A) It
alone probably best denotes park management policies as
realized during the first two decades.
This policy directive was not a Magna Carta for park
management that argued parks should be managed solely by
preservationist or utilitarian principles.

Rather, Mather

argued that park lands were to be used for recreation, and
thus, should be protected against any commercial or
"industrial use."5

Mather argued for development in parks

where warranted for the enjoyment and recreation of
visitors.

He encouraged the development of concessions.

encouraged the use of the automobile in the parks.

He

He

encouraged park personnel to take an active role in the
management of wildlife and range.

Yet, at the same time, he

created a set of bylaws to ensure the parks would remain in
their natural state.
4Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.27.
5The American Association for the Advancement of
science, "The safeguarding of National Parks'', Science,
January 1, 1923, p.629.
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The First Decade
With his stated mission for the parks, Mather next set
out to make parks more accessible to everyone, especially
automobile owners.
revived their

To accomplish this, Mather and Albright

promotional campaign for the parks in earnest

throughout the first decade.

This "ambitious publication

campaign included articles strategically placed in mass
circulation magazines like National Geographic'' as well as
professional journals.6

It also included articles targeted

at automobile owners to encourage their use.7

This campaign

was designed not only to provide information, enhance public
interest, and subsequently increase visitation, but it was
also to link the new NPS with the national parks.
efforts in all arenas quickly paid off.

Their

As public

awareness of park lands and support for the parks and NPS
increased, so did the legitimacy of NPS and congressional
response to park projects.
Within a period of ten years, park visitation increased
five hundred percent from 335,000 to 2.3 million.a

This

growth is largely attributed to Mather's promotional
6Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.25.
7Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.65.
8Stephen T. Mather, "A Glance Backward at National Park
Development", Nature Magazine, August, 1927, p.112.
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campaigns and introduction of the affordable automobile.
The rise in tourists encouraged a sharp increase in
appropriations for park roads and the addition of seven new
parks during this time: Ht. McKinley (1917), Grand canyon
(1919), Arcadia (1919), Zion (1919), Great smoky Mountains
(1926), Shenandoah (1926), and Mammoth cave (1926).

Funds

to establish the latter three parks were raised almost
entirely through matching grants aided by private
contributions.
Management of Concessionaires
To better accommodate the increasing numbers of guests,
Mather moved to drastically reorganize concession operations
in the first decade.

Appalled at "both the wasted space and

duplication of services" evidenced in many parks, Mather
subsequently decided that any business competition in parks
was unhealthy.9

He opted instead for "regulated

monopolies" that could provide everything visitors
needed.10

Under the organic Act, Mather was permitted to

"enter into contracts with responsible persons of firms for
up to thirty years, without having to advertise or accept
competitive bids for projects."11

Mather monitored these

9Dyan zaslowsky, "Black cavalry of Commerce", p.28.
lOibid., p.28.
llibid.
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"under strict Government supervision and rate control."12
Mather and Albright also replaced the Army personnel in
the parks with park rangers.

Rangers took on the

responsibilities of law enforcement in the parks but were
also there to provide nature talks and other interpretation
activities.

In addition to permanent rangers, university

professors were invited to give lecture series in the parks.
When Albright took over as the Superintendent of Yellowstone
in 1919, he began to recruit "ninety day wonders", better
known as college students, to put in new trails,
campgrounds, and provide nature education programs.13
As with any concessionaire or NPS project, Mather and
Albright were cautious to look at the ramifications of
their projects and congressional proposals.

Distinctions

were constantly being made as the park system grew in size
and stature as to what was appropriate in the parks and what
was not. For example, in Yellowstone, swimming pools and
bear dumps were endorsed where as dam proposals were fought.
In the Grand canyon, mule rides along the rims were
permitted while cable cars were not.14

In Yosemite, the

12Mather, "A Glance Backward at Park Development",
p.113.
13Albright, The Birth of the National Park Service,
p.142.
14Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p. 23.
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"fire fall'' over Yosemite falls was approved initially and
later banned.15

Mather and Albright considered themselves

to be conservative in their planning for the parks.

As

Mather noted
I am firmly against over-development of the parks by
too many roads, and only those needed to facilitate easy
access to the most scenic sections will be constructed.
Large areas will be retained in their original wilderness
condition, accessible only by trails for horseback riding
and hiking. In several instances we have been urged to
construct roads through sections of the park that are the
ranges of wild animals. In refusing to consider these
projects favorably, the Service is complying with the
expressed will of Congress to conserve the wildlife of the
parks.16
Once Mather's policy directive was implemented in the
parks, it won the support of a great many influential
persons.

The wealthy Americans, who made up the majority of

visitors to the national parks, "leaned toward minimal
development and preservation-oriented management."17

They

were pleased that the Park Service was taking "an active
role as promoter of tourism, road building, and hotel
development without losing support of its preservationist
constituency.''18

Also pleased were prominent

15Lillard I "Priorities in Nature • Preservation'',as
printed in Nash, Environment and Americans, (New York:
Krieger Publishing company, 1979) p.66.
16Stephen Mather, "What I am Trying to Do with the
National Parks", world's work, Hay, 1924, p.41.
17Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.29.
18Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.10.
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preservationists such as John Muir.

Muir recognized that

support for the parks was critical, even if it meant they
must "compromise their ideal of complete preservation ...
surely, they reasoned, the public's recreation could never
harm the parks the way dams could."19
Management Decisions Made in the National Interest
In the early years, Mather and Albright faced the
classic public policy problem of justifying the work of the
new bureaucracy and its importance to America to ensure
continued funding.

For this, they needed a strong

"favorable image, to convince the public what the agency
does is in keeping with the highest of popular values."20
Their desire to keep a strong favorable image often
lead them to management practices that were less than
scientifically sound.

With regard to wildlife management,

for example, Mather and Albright were inclined to feed elk
rather than see them starve through the winter.21

They had

no understanding, as did most persons of their time, of the
natural ecological food chain.

Mather and Albright also

continued the practice, initiated by the Army, of killing
19Zaslowsky, "Black cavalry of Commerce", p.29.
20Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.25.
(New

21Robert Shankland, Steve Mather of the National Parks,
Alfred A. Knopf, 1951) p.86.
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"mountain lions, wolves, and other killers" in the parks.22
NPS was always "looking to their extinction" as they were
thought to be "bad" animals.23

Furthermore, Mather and

Albright introduced non-native fish into parks' river and
streams in the hopes that they could create prime fishing
grounds.

In many of the larger parks, there were even fish

hatcheries set up to aid in this goal.
Early land management practices were another area in
the early years where a favorable public image dictated
policy. Throughout the Mather and Albright years all forest
fires were suppressed.

Forest fires were "the greatest

menace ... and guarded against by strict supervision (and)
constant patrolling."24

Forests were also cleared of any

dead trees where funds permitted as they were thought to mar
the view. And in many parks, cattle grazing was permitted.
Yet, these were management practices acted in innocence
rather than a renouncement of management by science.

As the

Report of the Delegate of the American Society of Zoologists
to the National conference on Parks was to add,
NPS is "without constructive plans of management ...
which will insure them against destruction from over use as
recreation parks. such plans of management must be based on
22Runte, National Parks: The American Experience,
p.111.

23Cameron, The National Park service, p.53.
24Ibid., p.52.
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knowledge of plant and animal ecology which they do not
possess."25
Yet, Mather and Albright, like many connected with the
parks at the time, had little concept of any contradiction
between preservation and use.

With a minuscule amount of

tourists enjoying the parks even at their peak in the 192030' s (in comparison to the numbers today) they could detect
no noticeable impact of tourists on natural areas.

so

accordingly, they widely encouraged tourism and conservative
development.

As Congress had earlier promised "not one cent

for scenery", it was extremely important that Mather and
Albright prove that national parks were profitable
enterprises.
Park Issues Mather and Albright Failed to Address
There were also several park issues Mather and Albright
failed to address in their tenure altogether.

Professional

papers relating to park management during this time were
quick to criticize NPS for failing to set any criteria as to
what constituted a national park.

Most parks at the time

were established as a result of local or political interest
in an area. outside of suggesting that they should be unique
in their policy directive, there was no directive to

25V.E. Shelford, "National Parks", Science, May 6,
1921, p.431.
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"safeguard national park standards."26

Some critics argued

there should be no additions to the national park system
which did not contain extraordinary features equal to that
of Yellowstone or Yosemite. Other critics, concerned with
preserving land for the sake of science as well as
recreation, argued for the establishment of parks just to
retain tracts in their natural state.27
There was also the question of boundary lines for the
national parks.

While Mather recognized that many of the

early park lines were ''arbitrarily set", it was difficult to
convince Congress and the local residents they should be
changed.

Even when they were changed they were usually

restructured to include "natural topographic features such
as rivers and mountain ranges."28

No thought was given as

to what area the natural ecosystem encompassed or to
migration habits.

Primarily, because parks in the early

years were not run on scientific principles, but rather on
Mather's business principles.
A third concern relating to NPS was that of the ever
26Robert s. Yard, "Congress and Conservation", The
survey, April 15, 1929, p.133.
~27Willard G. van Name, "Maintaining the standard and
the scientific usefulness of the National Parks", science,
August 17, 1928, p.157.
28Mather, "A Glance Backward at National Park
Development", p.113.
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increasing numbers of automobiles in the parks.

While the

automobile age had "promoted popular support for the parks",
negative environmental and recreational aspects associated
with thousands of cars in the parks was just being
realized.29

The National Parks Association (NPA), a private

organization supporting national parks, was one of the first
to make note of this in 1923.

They feared "that what it saw

as the true worth of the national parks--their value as
places for communion with nature ... would be diminished by
the flood of auto campers."30
Mather and Albright learned early, however, that you
cannot please everyone all of the time.

While Mather and

Albright moved to make parks more appealing to the public as
a whole, from the beginning NPS was forced to encounter
those who disapproved of the park concept in its entirety.
With each area that was transferred into a national park,
there were congressional battles.

The Forest service viewed

them as a threat every time a section of their land was
transferred to NPS.31

Mining interests and developing

interests were alarmed at each addition to the Park System.
29Everhart, The National Park Service, p.23.
30Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.29.
31Albright, The Birth of the National Park Service,
p.88.
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Mather moved to try to convince the public that parks
were advantageous for all.

To minimize interagency

conflict, he assured the Forest service that the Park
service's mission in land management was entirely different
from their utilitarian perspective.

As forests often

buttressed parks he argued, many "national parks play an
important part in protecting the watersheds of streams
important for economic use."32

To sooth those who lived on

the edge of parks and saw them as a threat to development,
he shared his vision of parks as business opportunities.

As

he argued, it was in everybody's interest to promote the
parks.

More support for the parks meant more opportunities

for those living on their boundary and more federal support
to further the protection of important tracts of land.
Analysis of the Mather Years
Mather and Albright's successes in the first two
decades are attributed to a great many things.

For one,

Mather unselfishly devoted himself entirely to the parks.
He donated money to see through the completion of projects
such as Tioga Road.

He also acted as a philanthropist,

encouraging others to give generously.

Whenever possible

both Mather and Albright heightened public awareness of the
parks through lectures and tours.

They succeeded primarily

32Mather, "A Glance Backward At National Park
Development", p.115.
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because of their own ingenuity and their desire to make the
national park concept a reality for many generations to
come.
Mather succeeded also, however, as he had the great
fortune of having a close relationship with the President,
Congress, and the secretaries of the Interior during his
term.

Mather "was a Bull Moose Republican" in a "Wilson

Democratic administration", but he rarely met with any
"political interference in getting his job done."33

He was

to come to know a great many of the Congressmen personally
and felt at home in requesting Congressional appropriations.
Secretary Lane was instrumental in justifying to Congress
and the people the need for the Park Service in its early
years.

Yet, Lane interfered little with park management

operations.

This NPS independence is reinforced by all

historical accounts of the early years of the park service.
In them, there are few references to Lane or the Department
of the Interior at all.34
33Albright, The Birth of the National Park Service,
p.18.
34There are only two conflicts between Lane and Mather
that are cited by historians. The first is Secretary Lane's
approval of the Hetch Hetchy Dam in 1913. The second is the
Fall River-Bechler dam proposal for Yellowstone National
Park. Introduced in the Senate by Senator Frank Nugget in
1919 Lane insisted that the Park Service respond favorably
to it over the objections of Mather and Albright. Cameron,
The National Park Service, p.20.
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Following Lane there was a quick succession of
Secretaries under President Harding between 1919-1921.

The

new Secretary, Albert Fall, avoided disturbing the work of
"the Park Service in any way."35

Hubert Work replaced Fall

in March of 1923 as the Secreatary of the Interior.36
Mather noted in 1924 that Work had "taken a deep personal
interest in the parks and forcibly defined his policy toward
them as one of complete protection from commercial
exploitation."37
At the same time, Mather and Albright benefitted as the
nation enjoyed a period of great economic prosperity.

While

this economic prosperity meant an increasing demand for
natural resources, it also made it easier for Mather to
secure large private donations for park projects.

During

his tenure, Mather secured private land donations to extend
Sequoia National Park, Yosemite, and many others.

Even when

35With Fall as well there was one issue that historians
recount Fall and Mather disagreeing upon. It was relating to
Secretary Fall's proposal for an all year round national
park in New Mexico to be used for both recreation and
commercial uses. Adamant that the land site was not national
park material, he avoided acting on it. Fall took it to
Congress himself in January 1923, where it failed. Albright,
The Birth of the Park Service, p.126.
36Jack Ellis Haymes, Haynes Guide: Handbook of
Yellowstone National Park, (Bozeman, Montana: Haynes
Studios, Inc., 1958) p.38.
37Mather, "What I am Trying to do with the National
Parks", p.42.
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Congress acted in 1919 to reject any "private funding of
governmental programs," Mather was still able to carry on
private promotional work through the establishment of the
National Parks Association.38

With the support of Congress,

he later was able to raise private funds to match government
grants for the purchase of private lands within park
boundaries as well.
Economic prosperity following the end of the first
world war also allowed more Americans the luxury of leisure
time.

This boon gave Mather and Albright's promotional

campaigns for the parks a boost as Americans could afford to
travel.

To add to this, there was the commencement of the

automobile age.

With the introduction of affordable

automobiles, Americans were able to experience the parks in
the numbers Mather never dreamed of .39

The popular new auto

brought more tourists into national parks and eventually
justified the need for a Park service.
The Albright Years

1929-33

Mather suffered a severe stroke in November, 1928 and
it rapidly became clear that he could no longer perform his
duties as Director.

He named Albright as his successor who

was sworn in on January 12, 1929.

Albright was well

38Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation, p.66.
39Harlean, Romance of the National Parks, p.82.
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prepared for the job. Having served three years as assistant
director and ten years as Superintendent of Yellowstone
National Park, he understood the Mather philosophy regarding
park management.

As he recalled in his memoirs,

The years had prepared me as well as anyone for the
job. I knew personally about one hundred members of Congress
and was on a first-name basis with about one-third of
them.40
The Service Albright inherited was twice as large as
the one Mather had begun with in 1917.

It was a well-

established organization incorporating "twenty-one national
parks and thirty-three national monuments, with 2.6 million
annual visitors, and a budget of $9 million.41

During his

tenure as Director, Albright concentrated his efforts on
buying up private plots of land within existing park
boundaries, expanding park boundaries, and bringing national
monuments and historical sites still under the jurisdiction
of the War Department over to the Park Service.
Aldo Leopold and the Age of Ecology
While park policies remained essentially the same
during the administration of Albright, as Mather had
established, nationwide there was the beginnings of an
understanding of ecology that would eventually move to have
a great impact on park management.

While the term "ecology"

40Albright, The Birth of the Park Service, p.256.
41Everhart, The National Park Service, p.28.
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had been around since 1866,

it was later through a rapid

succession of scientific breakthroughs that ecological
studies found life existed through interaction with other
life forms.42

Ecology came to be associated with the idea

that all living things within an environment were
interdependent.

It gave man a whole new way of looking at

nature.
Prior to the 1920-30's, man's "respect for nature had
been more sentimental and spiritual than scientific."43
This perspective can easily be seen in the writing of
Thoreau and Muir.

Yet, with the help of early ecologists'

such as Aldo Leopold, Bob Marshall, Victor E. Shelford, and
G.A. Pearsons, the science of ecology became better
understood.

As it did, people began to listen to ecologists

call for wilderness preserves.

While ecologists initially

looked to the Forest Service to establish these preserves,
they recognized the closest thing to them existed already in
the national parklands.
Conservation vs. Preservation
In line with the ecologists' findings, in 1933, V.E.
Shelford authored a very important article in Science
42Susan Flader, "Aldo Leopold and the Evolution of an
Ecological Attitude", as cited in Nash, Environment and the
Americans, p.115.
43Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p.194.
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magazine in which he defined the difference between
preservation and conservation with regard to the national
parks.

In many ways this was a radical idea in itself, but

as he explained:
Many people conceive of the National Park Service as a
conservation organization. To conserve, as the term is now
most frequently used, means to preserve while in use and it
often implies ultimate depletion. In actual practice the
operations carried on in the name of conservation are not
designed to preserve the natural order, not to establish and
maintain a different order as regards kind and abundance of
animals present. The difference between preservation and
conservation is well illustrated in a recent publication by
Wright, Dixon, and Thompson, who advocate the preservation
of the birds and mammals in national parks. They point out
the importance of dead timber to various birds and mammals,
and the need of such timber for numerous invertebrates might
well be added. Conservation as usually practiced removes
dead and mature timber, while preservation lets nature take
its course."44
V.E. Shelford thus linked the idea of preservation to
natural regulation long before its time.
The Parks and the New Deal
While a new thinking on park management was taking hold
in the scientific communities, in the business world, things
were grim.

The stock Market crash and onset of the Great

Depression in 1929 finally moved in to effect the parks by
1931. As it did, coping with the Depression became the Park
Service's priority.

NPS quickly found itself "an important

place in New Deal efforts to cope with the wounded economy

44V.E. Shelford, "Conservation Versus Preservation",
Science, June 2, 1933, p.535.
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and social consequences."45
Albright resigned from the Park Service in 1933, and
his assistant director, Arno B. cammerer, became his
successor.

While it was expected Cammerer would operated

the parks in the tradition of Mather and Albright, cammerer
instead saw the Park Service through the New Deal reforms
initiated by President Roosevelt.

It was a time, he

believed, to concentrate on "the necessities of life ... to
build ... a saner mode of living."46

No longer could the

Park service dictate policy in the political vacumn Mather
had realized.

Park Service autonomy was to some extent

relinquished in an effort to work with other government
agencies to the benefit of the people.
The Depression did not paint as a bleak a scenario for
NPS and the parks, as it did for so many others.

In June of

1933, President Roosevelt approved a Congressional
resolution "consolidating all national parks, all national
monuments, all national military parks, 11 national
cemeteries, all national memorials, and the parks of the
National capital under National Park Service

45Foresta, America's National Parks and Its Keepers,
p.43.
46Arno B. cammerer, "National Government Services
Through Recreation", Recreation, January, 1935, p.465.
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administration."47

In 1933, President Roosevelt also

"instituted a broad program of natural resource conservation
implemented in part through the Civilian Conservation corp
(CCC)".48

President Roosevelt's close ties with the

Secretary of the Interior Ickes made the Park service the
beneficiary of thousands of CCC workers.
Because of the depression, NPS had the advantage of
being able to employ the best architects, biologists,
archaeologists, and historians in the CCC program.

The CCC

set up camps in the parks and worked to build roads,
roadside information stands, trails, NPS housing, and
visitor facilities.

Many of these projects had been planned

by Mather and Albright, "but which had not been carried out
for lack of money and manpower."49
Between 1933-40, the Park Service was the recipient of
more that $220 million provided through a number of
emergency relief programs.SO

The majority of this money was

directed toward CCC endeavors. CCC operated 650 camps and
during the height of their program, employed 7,000 workers
47Ed, The National Parks: Shaping the System,
(Washington, D.c.: Department of the Interior, 1985) p.24.
48Ed, The National Parks: Shaping the system, p.42.
49Foresta, America's National Parks and Its Keepers,
p.44.
50Everhart, The National Park Service, p.32.
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in the national parks alone.
From a $50 million dollar grant extended by the Public
Works Administration (PWA), the Park service was able to
acquire more land. This enabled a portion of the everglades
in southern Florida to be designated a national park and the
Grand Teton National Park was extended as well.

National

seashores were also approved for preservation and recreation
purposes. The first to hold such status was Cape Hatteras.
A third source of funding for the Park Service came from
the Emergency Relief Administration (ERA).

They donated $28

million to be used for "recreation demonstration areas.''51
These sites were undeveloped tracts of land outside cities
that the Park Service developed for recreation purposes and
eventually returned to the cities.

While this project was

not in line with those traditional associated with the park
service, it brought the NPS to America's back door.

In

working on local community projects, NPS strengthened public
recognition of their agency and the integrity of the NPS
within many communities.
NPS As Recreation Leaders
In 1936, congress passed the Parks, Parkway, and
Recreation Act.

The Act "clearly established the Park

51Ibid., p.32.
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Service as the preeminent federal recreation agency."52
promoting recreation, the Act expanded their purpose.

In
In

providing technical assistance to other agencies, it was a
boost to their status.
times.

The Act was also a sign of the

In the 1930's, "recreation was a rapidly expanding

federal activity."53
There were others, namely the National Parks
Association and the Wilderness Society, who were very
dismayed to see the Park service labeled as a recreational
agency.

They considered the act to violate national park

standards.

National parks, in their eyes, were not

recreational grounds, but great natural areas to be revered.
To uphold that status, the National Parks Association
recommended dividing up the national park system.

On "one

side would be 'national primeval parks' ... on the other ...
the rest of the Park System and the other responsibilities
the agency had acquired."54

While the motion was never

seriously considered, it did address the conflict between
preservation and recreational use.

In questioning whether

parks were places for recreational activities, the National
52Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.45.
53Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.46.
54Ibid., p.47.
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Parks Association, the private foundation for NPS, argued
affirmatively for preservation.
The Parks During world war II
secretary cammerer resigned his position in 1940 and
was replaced by Newton B. Drury.

Drury's appointment was of

interest to many as he was the first chosen outside of the
career ranks of the National Park service.

He had served as

the head of California's "Save the Redwoods league for
twenty years.''55 Consequently, he did not view the parks so
much from a business perspective as had Mather, Albright,
and Cammerer.

His guiding park management principle was

''restraint."

He was not so anxious to make the parks as

accessible as possible and while this was a minor change in
emphasis, nevertheless, it was a significant one.
Drury was almost immediately to realize his goal for
the parks, but not as he had envisioned.

Shortly after his

appointment, "Pearl Harbor brought to a sudden end twentyfive years of almost unbroken growth for the Park Service.56
The men went off to war and the parks themselves virtually
shut down.

The total number of Park Service employees

dropped to 2,000 in response.
Albeit, during the war the parks were not totally
55Everhart, The National Park service, p.34.
56Ibid.
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disregarded.

As Congress looked for contributions to the

war effort, they looked to the parks.

In Olympic National

Park, they found Sitka spruce, a perfect material for
airplanes.57

In Yellowstone, they found an abundant supply

of elk, a perfect food source for the men abroad.
·while the elk meat proposal was just given lip service
in congress, the proposal to log Sitka spruce trees was
taken seriously.

In rebuttal, Director Drury argued before

congressional committees that "critical necessity rather
than convenience should be the governing reason for such
sacrifice of an important part of our federal estate."58
"Critical necessity" became the theme of Interior Secretary
Ickes as the whole Department took it upon themselves to
investigate the matter and pose alternative resources.
Fortunately for the parks, the war Department and Congress
found alternative resources to replace those in the parks.
But the case nevertheless set a precedent. In future years,
the policy became that one would have to show "critical
necessity" to be able to extract anything out of the parks.
The Park Service after 1945
Immediately following the end of the war, throngs of
people came to the parks.

The post war years were a time of

57Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.64.
58Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.65.
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recreation.

Popular magazines equated the national parks to

"Playgrounds for Everyone" and everyone wanted to know "How
to see a National Park."

suddenly, in peace times, millions

of "families in heavily laden sedans ... courageously set out
every summer to explore the wilds."59

By 1949, park

visitation had topped thirty million as compared to twentyone million in 1940.
While the public's interest in the parks was at an all
time high in the ensuing decade, congressional funding for
the parks remained at an all time low.

The parks total

budget had dropped from "$21 million in 1940 to $5 million
during the war" and remained low thereafter.GO

By 1949, the

total operating budget was just $14 million.
Dwindling federal funds forced massive staff reductions
during the war and it was soon evident that there would be
no replacement of these services.

By 1949, there were only

2,393 permanent employees to oversee 45 million acres·of
land as compared to 5,104 before the war.61
As a result of inadequate funds, Director Drury
reported, "rangers were cleaning the washrooms in the
Petrified National Forest, and directing traffic in Muir
59Dulles, A History of Recreation, p.324.
60Everhart, The National Park Service, p.34.
61Bernard Devoto, "The Easy Chair", p.67.
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Woods, while visitors roamed largely unguided and
unrestrained."62

Vandalism reached an apex as so many

treasure seekers and souvenir hunters were free to help
themselves.

Well traveled parks were littered with

graffiti and trash while delicate sub alpine terrain and
thermal features were destroyed.

In 1950 damage to park

facilities, trees, and monuments was estimated to be in the
millions of dollars.63
As a result of the wear and tear on the physical
structures realized from the hoards of visitors and neglect
during the war, Director Drury was to report to the
secretary in 1949, the "backlog of needed physical
improvements throughout the park system has pyramided to an
estimated cost of ... $496,000,000."64

For the 1949 fiscal

year, the National Park Service received an appropriation of
$7,440,000 for improvements.

It barely made a dent and

visitors were quick to complain.

As Bernard Devoto wrote,

A woman in travel-stained denim is angry because Indian
Creek campground is intolerably dusty ... Another woman
reports that the toilet at Inspiration Point Cliff has been
clogged since early last evening ... All but one of the
62Frank A. Tinker, "Vandalism--Nature's Number 1
Enemy", Nature Magazine, June, 1952, p.317.
63Annette H. Richards, "The Great American Litterbug",
Natural History, May, 1952, p.200.
64Annual Report of the Director of the National Park
Service to the secretary of the Interior, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1949) p.302.
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campgrounds looks like slums; in the observer's opinion, the
reason why they look that way is that they are slums.65
Yet, even as it seemed prudent to improve park facilities,
there were no subsequent increase in congressional funding.
With the commencement of the Korean War in 1950,
appr_opriations for the Park Service were again cut back.
Albeit, visitors did not stop coming.
The visitor count rose from thirty million in 1949 to
48 million by 1954.66

Some conservative critics attributed

this rise in popularity to a "phenomenal demand for outdoor
recreation."67

Other preservationists argued that people

sought "inspiration" ... (and an) ... "intimate experience ...
far from our highly urbanized and standardized
civilization. 11 68

Regardless, it was argued that they should

pay more of the privilege of doing so.

As it was noted, "if

motor visitors to Yellowstone during 1954 had paid just
$1.27 each toward what they received, instead of 75 cents,
and those to Yosemite 95 instead of 62 cents, they would

65Bernard, Devoto, "Let's Close The National Parks",
Harper's Magazine, October, 1953, p.49.
66Anthony Netboy, "Crises in our National Parks",
American Forests, May, 1955, p.26.
67Everhart, The National Park Service, p.35.
68Richards, "The Great American Litterbug", p.204.
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have paid the entire annual cost of the two parks.''69
even then, this was not likely to occur.

Yet,

All park revenues

were deposited in the federal Treasury.
Shortly thereafter, Bernard Devoto wrote a widely
publicized article in Harper's Magazine suggesting that the
government close all the parks.

It was the only

alternative, he stated, since neither Congress nor the
people cared that our "priceless heritage'' was "beginning to
go to hell."70

Frank Tinker argued that all that was truly

impressive in America should have remained relatively
unknown.

In that way, it would have only been sought out by

those with a "sincere interest" in it.71
Wildlife and Wildlands Management
In addition to the problems realized by increasing
numbers of visitors by the 1950's, there were also problems
to be reckoned with in the areas of wildlife and wildlands
management.

There had been few changes made in either area

since the days of Mather and Albright.

And yet, Mather and

Albright did not focus on the science of wildlife or
wildlands management to begin with.

They did their best to

69Ed, "Contents Noted", Nature Magazine, March, 1955,
p.119.
70Bernard Devoto, "Let's Close the National Parks'',
Harper's Magazine, October, 1953, p.51.
71Tinker, "Vandalism--Nature's Number #1 Enemy", p.314.
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set policies with the information they had available at the
time.

This left Drury and his followers to face the

consequences related to unbalanced wildlife populations.
By 1950, it was very apparent that few parks were
complete ecosystems. (i.e. all range lands and habitats
where park animals roamed were protected)

While Mather had

stated in his 1918 policy directive that parks needed to
incorporate only spectacular geographic features, it was a
policy implemented without the benefit of later
understandings of ecology.

Science had since proved that

animals were interdependent on one another. Yet, park
boundaries were set.

There was no money to enlarge them and

many border properties had been commercially developed
anyway.
In the parks, it was apparent that range reductions and
human interferences had altered normal wildlife
relationships. Albeit, in 1949, Director Drury described the
NPS method of wildlife management as "nonmanagement".

"In

theory", he stated, "all forms of wildlife are ... left to
shift for themselves."72

It was apparent by the 1950's if

the Park Service wanted to preserve the wildlife, new
management policies would be necessary.
Fortunately for the Park Service, many of their lands
72Annual Report of the Director of the Park service to
the Secretary of the Interior, 1949, p.317.
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had been carved out of Forest service holdings and remained
surrounded by national forests.

While the Forest Service

took a more utilitarian approach to resource management and
permitted seasonal hunting, wildlife was still better
protected on their property than in developed areas.

Yet,

this was still not enough to ensure the survival of many
species.

Without a complete ecosystem, some animals were

dying out while others were be coming overpopulated with the
absence of any natural predators.
In Yellowstone, for example, moose and deer populations
were decreasing as the elk were moving into their natural
winter range to find food.73

Consequently the elk

populations were multiplying at a terrific rate, especially
as they had no natural predators.

The Army and later the

Park Service had successfully decimated the mountain lion
and wolf populations by the 1920' in their belief that they
were "bad" animals.

While the Park Service had proposed to

the Montana State Game Department that they increase their
hunting permits for elk north of the park boundary, the Game
department refused.

Thus, Drury noted, the "Service itself

will be forced to affect a drastic reduction ... to save the
remaining range and associated wildlife."74
73Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p.23.
74Annual Report to the Secretary of the Interior from
the Director of the Park Service, 1949, p.317.
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Another problem to be reckoned with in regard to
wildlife was the bear populations in the parks.

Bears in

Yellowstone, Glacier, Yosemite, Sequoia, and Great smoky
Mountains all came to associated humans with food as
tourists "and their goodies ... managed to turn ... black
bears into panhandlers."75

consequently, beggar black bears

were becoming a menace on the roadsides.

The problem only

acerbated itself as more and more visitors were coming into
the parks.
With regard to wildland management, the greatest threat
to park terrain after the war Drury considered to be forest
fires. The policy with regard to forest fires was one of
immediate suppression, yet inadequate staff and funds often
kept park fires burning.

A second ongoing threat to the

wildlands was insect epidemics.

Beginning in 1949, congress

had provided funding to chemically control such bugs as the
pine bark beetle in Grand Teton National Park and the needle
miner in Bryce canyon National Park, but as the
appropriations were so small, the park service was not able
to control all infestations.76
75Ed. "Fifty Three Million On The Go", Newsweek, August
6, 1956, p.64.
76It is likely that the limited funding in this case
may have saved a great deal of the parks' wildlife. In their
innocence, one of the more popular chemical sprays used was
DDT. Annual Report of the Director of the National Park
service to the Secretary of the Interior, p.321.
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Echo Park Controversy
In addition to all the problems facing the Park Service
with regard to the interior of the parks, the power of the
agency was put to the test several times during Drury's
administration.

The showdown, however, came in 1950

regarding a proposed dam project for Dinosaur National
Monument near Echo Park, Colorado.

It fell in line with a

number of other dam proposals for parks and appeared to be
the critical deciding factor.

As it was noted in the

initial department hearings, "let's open this to its
ultimate and inevitable extent, and let's settle ... once and
for all time ... whether we may have ... wilderness areas ...
in the United states." 77
Drury had approved of a dam study in this area by the
Bureau of Reclamation in the 1940's.

While he may have

considered the approval to be just a courtesy extended to
the Bureau of Reclamation, over the years they garnered
political support for the project.
to build.

By 1950, they were ready

The Park Service, however, ''had failed to keep

its allies, the preservation groups, informed of the
issue.''78

They had no political momentum behind them to

oppose the dam and when Secretary Chapman approved it, it
77Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p.210.
78Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.51.
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seemed as if it would become a reality.
By 1951, all that NPS could hope for was that congress
would defeat the Echo Park dam.

In senate and House

hearings, however, it was evident the project had a great
deal of support. It came mainly from: "Congressman,
governors, civic clubs, chambers of commerce, utility
companies, water-users associations, the Bureau of
Reclamation, and a tribe of Navaho Indians."79 Opposition
came primarily from preservation organizations and
educational groups.

The Park service as an agency under the

Department of the Interior was in no position to directly
oppose it.

Thus, they were forced to rely on the support of

interest groups and public appeal.
this proved to be enough.

Fortunately for them,

After a long battle in Congress,

the Echo Park dam legislation was defeated on April 1,
1956.80
Wilderness advocates hailed the def eat as a great
victory.

In the face of future dam proposals, they were

encouraged that with the Echo Park decision, Congress had
affirmed the value of undeveloped land.

For the Park

Service, though, there was little joy in the victory.
79Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p.216.
80Michael Frome, Battle For The Wilderness,
(Washington: Praeger Publishers) 1974, p.131.
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power over the fate of parklands had been tested and it was
clear they were not in control.

Rather in this case, NPS

was dangerously dependent on their allies.

As Foresta

explained in America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
An agency always pays a price for the support of its
allies. The greater the relative strength of the allies, the
greater the restrictions they will be able to impose on an
agency and the greater will be the consideration of their
interests in the formation of common goals.81
While the Park Service had previously enjoyed a great deal
of autonomy in its decision-making processes regarding the
parks, the Echo Park controversy signalled a weakening of
this power. Yet, the Park service's reliance on its allies
was only beginning.
A Changing of the Guard
In the heat of the Echo Park controversy, Director
Drury had resigned and Conrad L. Wirth was appointed the new
Director after a short period of leadership by Arthur E.
Damaray.

Wirth, unlike Drury, was a career Park Service

official with "practical knowledge of how things get done in
washington."82

And undeniably, there was plenty to be done.

With the parks and the Park Service's integrity rapidly
diminishing, he

s~t

about to change the system almost

immediately.
81Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.51.
82Everhart, The National Park Service, p.36.
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Mission 66
To combat the problems facing the parks, in 1955
Director Wirth announced the beginning of "Mission 66, ... a
ten year rehabilitation and capital development program ...
to improve facilities, staffing, and resource preservation
at all areas in time for the 50th anniversary of the
Service."83
oriented.

This program was designed to be conservation
As Director Wirth noted, "to achieve specific

protection goals within a park, the best control is properly
planned and executed development."84

As Lou Garrison,

Chairman of the Mission 66 Steering committee concurred,
"appropriate development of facilities such as roads or
trails actually could be viewed as a conservation and
protection measure, as it tended to channel and restrict
use."85

With eighty million visitors projected to visit

the parks in 1966, it was apparent some action in this
direction needed to be taken.
It was calculated in 1955 that "Mission 66" would cost
the federal government $800 million over the period of ten
years.86 To garner support for the project and necessary
83Ibid.

I

p. 42.

84Conrad L. Wirth, "Mission 66", American Forests,
August, 1955, p.16.
85Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, (New York: THe
Atlantic Monthly Press} 1986, p.204.
86Everhart, The National Park Service, p.36.
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funding, Wirth looked to the American Automobile Association
(AAA) and environmental groups for help.

While AAA

sponsored the kick-off activities in Washington for the
program, the "surge of publicity calling attention to the
dilemma of the national parks", was also a boon to the
cause.87
In a meeting between President Eisenhower and Wirth in
1956, the President pledged full support for Mission 66.
With that advantage, a bill was submitted with some funds in
it for every Congressman with a park in his district.

Not

surprisingly, "Congress bought Mission 66 completely and
gave it a warm reception at budget-hearing time.88
Eventually, Congress would wind up contributing more that $1
billion for this one NPS program.
Conclusion
At the close of the 1950's, NPS found itself facing a
myriad of problems throughout the national park system. Yet,
it was hoped that as a result of Mission 66 some of the
tension on the park's facilities would be relieved. It was
also hoped that satisfactory completion of Mission 66 would
help NPS to regain integrity, agency independence that was
lost as a result of the war, and more federal funding.
87Wirth, "Mission 66", p.17.
88Everhart, The National Park Service, p.37.
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The Park service had become well established by the
1950's, however.

It was clear people loved their parks and

with the increase in vacation time, people were getting out
and enjoying them more.

Mather, Albright, and their

predecessors had done their job well.

In the process of

building up public support, they had also built up a
powerful political constituency, including key congressional
officials and environmental organizations.

While the costs

of a powerful political constituency was realized in the
Echo Park Controversy, the alliance nevertheless proved to
be beneficial to the ecological integrity of the parks.

NPS

came to recognize that agency autonomy in some cases would
have to be sacrificed.

L

Chapter III
Management of the national parks changed drastically
between the 1950's and 1960's, in part because of the parks'
increasing popularity.

As the public continually showed

more interested in the parks, more people and political
forces wanted a say in the management of these lands.

For

the first time, these forces began acting on NPS to
significantly usurp its autonomy.

Together, the power of

these forces bespoke of a new era in park management.
It is important to note that there was no one single
force impacting the Park Service during the sixties.
Rather, the forces of change were many.

For the purposes of

this thesis, I would like to discuss three of these forces:
secretary Udall, environmental lobbies, and congress.

These

are the three most significant forces of change during the
sixties because of the legacy they left on park management.
The State of the Parks - 1960
In the early years of the Park Service, the directives
for the service had been relatively forthright.

Mather and

Albright knew they needed people in the parks in order to
justify their existence and the question was how best to
attract the people.

The Park Service in the 1960's,

however, was much different.

Objectives were fused with the

lack of consensus as to what was the appropriate role of
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parks.

In the face of an overwhelming number of visitors by

1960, the preservationist constituency was very concerned
about their impact on the environment.

They were also

disturbed that the "modern style of tourism was depriving
the parks of their central symbolism, their message about
the relationship between man and nature, and man and
industrial society. 11 1

The utilitarian was disturbed because

there were not adequate facilities to provide for the
tourists.

Mission 66 was not keeping up with the demand as

a private manager might be able to.
Mission 66 had been sold to Congress and the public by
Director Wirth in 1955 as a catch all plan and conservation
program for the parks to refurbish them.

But it appeared as

early as 1960, that Mission 66 was not all that the parks
needed.

Despite the Park service's work to improve

facilities, interpretation programs, and park protection
under Mission 66, park visitation was increasing at such an
astronomical rate that the program afforded in reality
little protection for the park or improvements for the
guests.
seventy two million people visited the national parks
in 1960, a sharp increase from the fifty-four million in
1955.2

Consequently, facilities and services were still

lSax, Mountains Without Handrails, p.11.
2Statistical Abstracts, 1989.
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inadequate.

Park personnel could not keep up with the

visitors demands.

Even the protective efforts on the part

of the Park Service were not ensuring that the geologic
wonders many were corning to see were not being destroyed.3
As the preservationists described it, Mission 66 was
"road-oriented and big-development oriented."4

As Edward

Abbey noted in Desert Solitaire, "Industrial Tourism is a
threat to the national parks."5

so long as we are willing

to build more roadways and facilities in the parks, he
argued, "rangers are going quietly nuts answering the same
three basic questions five hundred times a day: (1) Where's
the john? (2) How long's it take to see this place? (3)
Where's the Coke rnachine?"6
In 1960, the Mission 66 program was reevaluated and
reassessed.

Secretary Seaton, in a letter to Director Wirth

in 1960 indicated that more land should be set aside as
parks, more personnel should be employed, but never was it
mentioned that more facilities should be built to
accommodate guests.

Seaton's goal rather was to "preserve

3Ed., "Mission 66 Reappraised", National Parks
Magazine, April, 1961, p.2.
4Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p.207.
5Edward Abbey, Desert Solitaire, (New York: Ballatine
Books, 1968) p.59.
6Ibid.

I
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the wilderness areas in the system."7
Association took a similar view.

The National Parks

It was their

recommendation that visitors could do with "fewer and lesselaborate visitor accommodations", fewer roads, but greater
amounts of "management, protection, and research in the
parks."8
The Kennedy Administration and the New Frontier in the Parks
At the same time that Mission 66 was being reassessed
in 1960, there was a changing of the guard in the White
House.

With the election of a new president: John Kennedy

and his subsequent appointment of a new Secretary of the
Interior: Stewart Udall, a new direction for the parks was
declared.

Udall led this new direction for parks guided by

his own ideas about conservation and park management.
While previous Interior Secretaries had left the Park
Service pretty much alone, deferring to the experienced
career men that served as Directors, Udall did not.

Coming

into office, Secretary Udall "made no effort to disguise the
fact that his first two loves within the Department were
Indian affairs and the national parks".9

He took an active

role in park management to a degree previous Interior
7Ed., "The Six Points", American Forests, February,
1960, p.25.
8Ed., "Mission 66 Reappraised", p.2.
9Everhart, The National Park Service, p.38.
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Secretaries had not.

Consequently, Udall was to have a

great impact on the parks and the Park service during his
tenure.
Mission 66, in Udall's mind, was not the direction that
the Park service should be taking.

As Udall saw it, .Mission

66 still "reflected a great faith in progress rather than a
healthy distrust for it ... Its building program reflected
assumptions about the harmony of development and wilderness
which were no longer in fashion."10

Without Mission 66,

"there probably would have been a disaster of
insufficiency".11

Much of the blame for the unpopular

program was placed on Wirth who initiated it and still
shared the progressive ideas of his predecessors towards the
parks.

so with pressure brought on from Secretary Udall,

Wirth resigned in October, 1963 and was replaced by George
B. Hartzog.12
Hartzog and Udall both found the Park Service in a
turbulent time as it began to struggle for the first time
with its equivocal mission both to preserve the parks and
provide for their use.

To realign park management, Udall

lOForesta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.67.
llGeorge Hartzog, "Over the Years With the National
Park Service", National Parks, May, 1969, p.14.
12John Prokop, "Man in the Middle", American Forests,
p. 35.
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decided that areas within the national park system would be
divided into three categories: natural, historical, and
recreational.13
emphasized.

In the natural areas, preservation would be

In the historical areas, historical facilities

would be maintained while preservation of the land would be
secondary.

In recreational areas, "both natural and

historic resource preservation would be subordinate to
management for outdoor recreation."14

Management plans

appropriate to these three different areas would then be
drawn up and administered.
Park management plans under Hartzog were also revised
so that each unit of the Park Service would have more
autonomy in the decision made regarding that unit.

While

Mather and Albright had strived to achieve a sense of
uniformity in park management, the diverse needs of the
Service no longer found "one over-all policy of management"
to be the most effective.15

Thus, Yellowstone biologists

were permitted to solve the problem of their rapidly growing
elk herd as they saw fit while the Master Plan in the Great
smoky Mountains National Park focused on enlarging the
13"Memorandum to the Director of the National Park
Service to the service from the Secretary of the Interior on
Management of the National Park System", July 10, 1964.
14NPS, The National Parks: Shaping the System,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985) p.62.
15Prokop, "Man in the Middle", p.36.
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campgrounds.
Finally, both Udall and Hartzog firmly believed the
Park service should be expanded.

In his July 10, 1964

directive to Hartzog, Udall specifically requested that NPS
continue to take on additional areas of natural, historic,
and recreational value.

During the sixties, consequently,

NPS made numerous recommendations to congress of appropriate
land acquisitions.

With a conservationist-minded

administration and Congress, it was possible to expand the
NPS system by more than five million acres by 1969.16
The Rise of the Environmental Organizations
While the Park Service was rethinking its management
plans for the parks, it was clear public concern for the
environment was on the upswing.

Spurred by books such as

Silent Spring and Science and survival, awareness of the
threats to the environment were receiving a great deal of
public attention.17
By the 1960's, it was becoming painfully evident to
many Americans that true wildlands were diminishing at an
astronomical rate.

Industry "appeared destined to occupy

all the unoccupied lands", while those set aside as parks
16Hartzog, "Over the Years with the National Park
Service", National Parks, p.14.
17Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, (Boston: Houghton
Mifflen, 1962); Barry commoner, science and Survival, (New
York: Viking Press, 1966).
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were becoming more congested every year.18
responded with a outcry of concern.

The public

Their concern led to a

surge in memberships in major environmental organizations
throughout the United States.

Throughout the sixties,

environmentalists organizations, such as the Sierra Club and
Wilderness society, were growing rapidly in terms of
followers, lobbying dollars, and political power.
The membership growth of the Sierra Club, alone,
increased ten fold between 1945-65.

Yet, for those

connected with organizations such as the Sierra Club and
Wilderness society, it was not enough just to fight for
environmental protection.

They were determined to have a

say in park management and did so by lobbying Congress for
new legislation affecting the parks.

The environmentalists

had earlier shown how much power they could wield in
Congress during the Echo Park controversy.

At the time, it

proved to be greater than that of the Park Service, even
though the agency later chose to ignore "the wishes of its
preservationists supporters in carrying out Mission 66. 11 19
In the sixties, however it appeared, environmentalist
organizations were to be a force to be reckoned with in
deciding park management policies.
18Frome, The Battle for Wilderness, p.138.
19Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.69.
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one common concern shared by most of these environmental
organizations was the rapid increase in park visitation.
While the country's population increased 9.4 percent between
1960-1969, visits to the national park system increased
ninety percent during the same time period.20

If parks were

to remain great wilderness areas, it was clear park success
could no longer be counted in terms of numbers of visitors
as it had been for the past forty-five years.

The land

simply could not support the numbers entering the parks.
Moreover, there was a recognized "saturation point beyond
which the wilderness experience' was no longer possible."21
While there was no consensus what this maximum carrying
capacity for the parks was, most were sure it was eminent
and called for more prudent wilderness management.
The public raised such an outcry in the 1960's that the
Park Service had no choice but to reevaluate their
traditional park management practices.

No longer would the

progressive vision Mather had for the parks be acceptable to
the public.

something new was needed as all the park's

traditional sources of support began to fall away.

The

momentum as it was, lay with the environmental organizations
20Hartzog, "Over the Years with the National Park
Service", National Parks, p.14.
21Ed., "Some Thought on Future Park Policy", National
Parks Magazine, November, 1966, p.20.
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such as the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society.

And

they had lost faith in the idea that preservation
accompanied progress.
The Wilderness Act
The first showdown between the Park service and
environmental organizations in the sixties came as a result
of a proposed wilderness bill.

This bill, under study in

Congress since 1957, was designed to give "an unprecedented
degree of protection to wild country."22

While the Park

Service, Forest service, and Bureau of Land Management all
provided for the construction of roads and accommodations on
their property, the proposed wilderness bill would ensure
that there would be some land left as much as possible in
its natural state.
The idea for such a wilderness bill came about in the
mid-1950's.

At that time, it was noted by scientist James

P. Gilligan, that "wilderness in America was doomed to
extinction under the prevailing conditions and that
prevailing conditions could not be altered unless
preservation interests formed a united front in support of
some positive program of wilderness preservation."23
Sierra club picked up on this and proposed "a national
22Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p.221.
23Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation,
p.102.
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wilderness preservation system based on legislation to be
drafted through the cooperation of federal land-management
agencies and conservation organizations."24

The

organizations that actually drafted the bill, however, were
the Citizens committee on Natural Resources, the council of
Conservationists, the Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club,
the National Wildlife Federation, the National Parks
Association, and the Wildlife Management Institute along
with the aid of others.
As it was proposed by Senator Hubert Humphrey on June
7, 1956, the initial legislation listed eighty areas in the
national forests, forty-eight in national parks and
monuments, twenty in national wildlife refuges, and fifteen
on Indian reservations that would comprise the wilderness
system.

Its intent was "to secure for the American people

the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness."25

The

need for it lay in the fact that many people, including
environmental organizations wanted a greater assurance that
there would be land that was not developed.
It quickly emerged that the federal land agencies were
opposed to any such wilderness preservation system.

The

Park Service opposed the idea of a congressionally-mandated
24Frome, Battle for the Wilderness, p.138.
25Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p.220.
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wilderness system on federal land as it would limit their
authority over park lands.

After all, according to their

enabling legislation, they were designated the supreme
federal preservation agency.

Wirth also "questioned the

appropriateness of many Indian and wildlife refugee lands
for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation
System."26
But the environmentalists organizations were adamant
that there was a need for designated wilderness areas.
Historically, land management policies in "national forests
had been only an administrative decision subject to change
at any time by Forest Service personnel.

Even the laws

creating the national parks and monuments deliberately left
the way open for the construction of roads and tourist
accommodations.''27

The Park service management philosophy

at the time could not prove that there were indeed tracts of
land that were totally safe from any future development.
They were still of the mindset that land could have
multiple uses.

Land, as Wirth saw it, could be both used

and preserved for future generations.
The debate over the wilderness bill droned on into
1964.

one reason for its delay was the defensive front

26Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation,
p.110.
27Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, p.221.
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against any such legislation being led by logging
industries, oil, grazing, mining interests, professional
foresters, and other developers.

But finally a ground swell

of grassroots support lead by the popular environmental
movement secured the legislation.

on April 10, 1963 the

wilderness bill passed in the Senate 73 to 12.

It was

later approved in a different form in the House, differences
were reconciled, and it was signed into law September 3,
1964.28
The passage of the wilderness bill proved that the
forces of the popular environmental movement were not to be
easily dealt with in the 60's.

Momentum was definitely in

their direction.
The Leopold Report
At the same time the Wilderness Act was ratified,
Staker Leopold, son of Aldo Leopold, and other
environmentalists made public a government report detailing
how parks should be managed.

Written on the request of

Secretary of the Interior Udall, the Leopold Committee
concluded that national parks ideally should "represent a
vignette of primitive America."29

The committee recognized

28Frome, The Battle for the Wilderness, p.140.
29The Leopold committee Report, "Wildlife Management in
the National Parks", as reprinted in American Forests,
April, 1963, p.33.
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that most were not complete ecosystems, but they recommended
"as a primary goal ... that the biotic associations within
each park be maintained ... as nearly as possible in the
condition that prevailed when the area was first visited by
white man. 11 30
It was a radical idea for national parks, which for the
most part, had virtually no wildlife management policies
based on science at all.

Yet, the Leopold Report recognized

too, at the time, they did not have all the necessary
"ecological skills

11

to carry out such a plan.

Not enough

was known about the original state of parklands as most had
been developed prior to being set aside.

Thus, the Leopold

committee recommended that "a greatly expanded research
program ... be developed by the Park service itself ... Both
research and the application of management methods should be
in the hands of skilled park personnel. 11 31

The first

priority of the Park service, they argued, should be
historical research.
Environmental groups lauded the idea.

In their

recommendations, the Leopold committee "did not yield to
western pressures to open our parks to public hunting" in an

30The Leopold Report, "Wildlife Management in the
National Parks", p.33.
31Ibid.
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effort to keep the wildlife populations under control.32
Rather, it made them "proud to be identified with
conservation" as it seemed to be a definitive step in
solving the wildlife management problems plaguing the larger
parks.33

The Park Service was less certain.

District

rangers in both Yellowstone and the Grand canyon who had
been artificially controlling ungulate populations for
years, had their doubts that a complete ecosystem could be
recreated.

secretary Udall, as well, "was reluctant to

accept the committee's findings."34

Yet, as Starker Leopold

recalled, "the environmental community received it so
enthusiastically, that Udall changed his mind."35

On May

23, 1963, secretary Udall ordered the service to "take such
steps as are appropriate to incorporate this philosophy and
the basic findings into the administration of the National
Park Service."36
Congress and the Parks
The shifting balance of power in park management in the
32Ed., "Leopold Committee Report", American Forests,
April, 1963, p.11.
33Ed., "leopold committee Report", American Forests,
April, 1963, p.11.
34Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p.34.
35Ibid., p.34.
36Ibid.
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1960's cannot entirely be credited to the rising
environmental groups or secretary Udall.

A third key player

was Congress.
In the 1960's, Congress began a move to "gain some
control over their expanding workloads and over the
increasing fragmentary nature of their work."37

They

accomplished this by expanding congressional staffs,
improving the Congressional Research service, and expanding
the responsibilities of the General Accounting Office.

This

move was to have a significant impact on the autonomy of the
Park Service.
Prior to the 1960's, the Park service was one of many
agencies that operated with little congressional control or
oversight, primarily because Congress did not have the
resources and the Park service was a small agency and
relatively non-controversial.

With the increase in human

resources in the 1960's, however, Congress was able to play
a greater role in bureaucratic oversight and consequently
was in a better position to monitor federal agencies,
including the Park Service.

Congressional oversight

"heightened expectations and Congress came to expect more

37Michael J. Malbin, "Delegation, Deliberation, and the
New Role of congressional staff" as cited in ed. Thomas E.
Hann, The New congress, (Washington: American Enterprise for
Public Policy Research, 1981) p.134.
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control over the federal bureaucracy."38

The Park service

was no exception.
In the 1960's "Congress increased its sway over the
Park System, (and) the environmental groups in turn
increased their influence over Congress."39

Thus,

environmental groups exhibited even more political clout as
they exerted their force both on the Park service and
Congress.

Park policy making in the sixties became public

decision-making to be made by very powerful environmental
and Congressional groups as well as federal land agencies.
In his book, Parks, Politics, and the People, Wirth
provides a great deal of insight into NPS/Congressional
relations during the sixties.

Of special interest, he

notes, was the strength of the House committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, led by congressman Wayne N. Aspinall
(D-CO) from 1959-72.

As he stated,

The record of the committee during that period is
outstanding from a Park service point of view. I don't
recall a park bill reported out of committee that ever
failed to pass once it was called up in the House for
consideration.40
The number of NFS-related bills corning out of Aspinall's
38Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.75.
39Ibid., p.76.
40Conrad Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People,
(Norman: university of Oklahoma Press, 1980) p.324.
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committee was impressive.

Many of these bills to be passed

into law enlarged the park system and defined policy and
administrative matters.

While many bills increasing the

park system were passed after Wirth's retirement, arguably
Wirth notes, ''the big influx of proposed legislation to add
new parks to the system result(ed) from studies made during
Mission 66."41
This committee work was encouraging to NPS who had
suffered since W.W.II when Congress "seemingly lost interest
in the park system."42

The additions to the park system

gave it the vote of confidence it needed.

But it is

important to note that the NPS legislation coming out of
Congress was not entirely preservation oriented.

A classic

example of alternative legislation affecting the parks was
The concessions Act.
The Concessions Act
At the same time that the Park Service was trying to
diffuse what the Wilderness Act and the Leopold Report meant
for the parks, the concessions Act was passed by congress.
It was a seeming antithesis to both the Wilderness Act and
the Leopold Report.

While the Wilderness Act and the

Leopold Report stressed keeping things in their natural
41Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, p.335.
42Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p.200.
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state, the Concessions Act made it more feasible for
concessionaires to build facilities and provide services to
visitors.

It was in fitting with the age of the Great

Society and the New Frontier's emphasis on recreation.
After all, how can one recreate without the aid of
recreation facilities?

Albeit, the mission of the Park

Service, it seemed, was again lost in the desires of outside
interests.
The Concessions Policy Act of 1965 was designed to
refine National Park service policies toward concessionaires
to make it easier for them to survive in a seasonal
operation.

Even with the hoards of tourists visiting the

national parks, concessionaires were having a difficult time
realizing a profit because of the NPS regulations.
The regulations as they had evolved since Mather's time
had changed very little.

Under the NPS organic act, the

Park service was permitted "to enter into contracts with
'responsible' persons or_ firms for up to thirty years,
without having to advertise or accept competitive bids for
projects."43

concessionaires continued to act as "regulated

monopolies" in the parks, however, they never owned the land
nor did they have legal title to their buildings.44
43Dyan zaslowsky, "Black cavalry of Commerce",
Wilderness, Spring, 1983, p.29.
44Ibid., p.28.
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there were informal agreements made between the Park service
and the concessioner in many cases, even so, this system
gave a "great deal of discretion to" the Park service.45
The Concessions Policy Act, evolving from a congressional
review of the concession situation, set about to amend the
discrepancies.
The Concessions Policy Act "recognized the existence of
concessionaires and stated that their operations were proper
if their services were appropriate and necessary."46

But

more importantly, it gave concessionaires "all incidents of
ownership except legal title."47

This was accomplished by

giving concessioner a "possessory interest" in the parks
which provided them with "more control".48

As long as

concessionaires met their part in the contact with the Park
service, they had the right to operate concession facilities
in the park and this could not be taken away "without just
compensation."49

The concessionaires also benefited under

45Don Hummel, stealing the National Parks, (Bellview,
Washington: The Free Enterprise Press, 1987) p.208.
46Fred B. Eiseman, Jr., "Who Runs the Grand canyon?",
Natural History, March, 1978, p.83.
47Public Law 89-249, 89th congress, H.R. 2091, October
9, 1965, "Relating to the Establishment o~ Concession
.
Policies in the Areas Administered by National Park Service
and for Other Purposes".
48Dyan zaslowsky, These American Lands, (New York:
Henry, Holt, and co., 1986) p.51.
49Hummel, stealing the National Parks, p.246.
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the act as it guaranteed them a "preferential right' in
renewing their contracts.50

This meant that the Park

Service could not solicit or even consider any other
concessionaires' offers until the existing concessioner
decided not to renew the contract.
The Park Service Response to the Wilderness Act, Leopold
Report and concessions Act
As the SOth anniversary of the Park service came and
went, the Park Service was painfully aware that they were no
longer the same autonomous agency that they were when the
Service was established.51

While the Park Service had

realized a great deal of success in the first fifty years,
whether it be measured in the millions of acres of park
lands, millions of visitors, or millions of federal dollars,
in their success, they lost some of their independence.
This was all too apparent in the passage of the Wilderness
and concessions Acts.

It was also evident that the Park

Service desperately needed a proactive plan for management
that specifically spelled out its management objectives.

As

Edward Abbey noted in Desert Solitaire, "it is apparent that
we cannot decide the question of development versus
sozaslowsky, "Black cavalry of Commerce", p.30.
51Philip M. smith, "New Approaches to National Park
Administration and Management", National Parks Magazine,
February, 1968, p.14.
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preservation by a simple referral to holy writ or an attempt
to guess the intention of the founding fathers; we should
make up our own minds and decide for ourselves what the
national parks should be and what purpose they should
serve."52
The National Park Service responded to the Wilderness
Act and the Concessions Act with little enthusiasm.

Both

laws clearly restricted their management options in certain
areas.

The Leopold Report, however, was to have the

opposite effect on NPS.

Both Secretary Udall and Director

Hartzog were to use this highly publicized paper in the
ensuing years to implement long overdue directives for
change.

In lieu of a well-accepted management plan

emanating from NPS or the Interior Department, the Leopold
Report would have to do.
The Park Service Response to the Wilderness Act
As designated by the Wilderness Act, the Secretary of
the Interior was to review every roadless area in the
national parks, national monuments, and wildlife refugee
systems and make subsequent recommendations as to which were
"suitable" for "wilderness" designation.

These

recommendations were to be sent to the President and then
onto congress, who would make the final decision.

52Edward Abbey, Desert Solitaire, p.55.
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Secretary had ten years to complete his study of all lands
included in the Park System.53
Problems with this system were apparent right from the
start.

Neither the Park Service nor the secretary of the

Interior was anxious to classify land as it undermined the
purposes of the parks' Organic Acts as well as that of the
NPS's. They wanted to be able "to reserve flexibility in
respect to wilderness in the parks."54

Moreover, there was

no consensus as to what classified as "suitable" land.
While the restrictions on wilderness areas were explicit,
the classification of "wilderness" had been left to NPS.
NPS promptly set up a complex zoning classification system
that provided them with a number of loopholes by which to
avoid classifying land as "wilderness."
The zoning system that the Park Service offered to the
public came forth under the guise of the Master Plans for
each park.

As Hartzog described it in 1967,

It has long been the practice of the National Park
Service to prepare and m~intain a Master Plan to guide the
use, development, interpretation, and preservation of each
particular park. Graphics and narrative specify the
objectives of management. These Master Plans in the true
sense of the word are zoning plans. They not only define
the areas for development, but also define the areas in
53Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation,
p.148.
54A.W.S., "Common sense on Park Protection", National
Parks Magazine, September, 1968, p.2.
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which no developments are to be permitted.SS
The main difference between the wilderness areas set aside
under the Master Plans for the parks, however, and the
wilderness areas that could be created under the Wilderness
Act was: Park Service control.

The Park service would

always be in control of those areas they designated
wilderness under their Master Plans.

They would be free to

change a particular area's classification if they cared to.
The Wilderness Act would not afford them the same freedom.
In the meantime, however, Secretary Udall and
Director Hartzog did make two recommendations for
"wilderness" tracts to be instated in craters of the Moon
National Monument and Lassen Volcanic National Park.

The

combined acreage of both tracts of land was less than
100,000 acres.56
disappointed.

Environmental groups were clearly

Some accused the Park service of "using the

review process to set aside large tracts of land for park
developments."57

In doing so, the parks would be able to

accommodate more guests, win more supporters, who would in
turn lobby Congress for more facilities in the parks.
55Hummel, stealing the National Parks, p.249.
56Ed. "Park Wilderness Hearings", National Parks
Magazine, September, 1966, p.21.
57Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation,
p.148.
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Later, three more tracts of land were recommended by
the Secretary and Director to be included in the wilderness
system: Petrified Forest, Pinnacles, and Lava Beds.58

Yet,

the real battle over the Wilderness Act emerged in the Great
Smoky Mountains National Park.

There, as part of the NPS

Master Plan for the area, the Park service desired to build
a major road running in between the mountains and connecting
many of the remote mountain areas.

Director Hartzog argued

the road would provide better access to wilderness threshold
areas.

As Hartzog stated, "the only facilities planned in

these natural-environment lands are the minimum required for
public enjoyment, health, safety, preservation, and
protection of the features, such as one-way motor nature
trails, small overlooks, informal picnic sites, short nature
walks, and wilderness-type uses."59

To Wilderness Act

advocates, this proposal was in direct violation of the NPS
commitment of preservation.

As Anthony Wayne Smith,

President of the National Parks and Conservation Association
stated, "the actual purpose of the so-called wilderness
thresholds, whether acknowledged or not, is really to
reserve such areas for road, parking lot, and facility
58A.W.S., "Common sense on Park Protection", National
Parks Magazine, September, 1968, p.2.
59Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation,
p. 150.
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development in the future."60
In June of 1969, one hundred prominent
environmentalists met with Interior secretary Hickel and
requested that the road proposal be abandoned.

Hickel

instead offered an alternative roadway, one which still
included visitor services, but instead it skirted along the
edge of the park instead of through the middle of it.61

The

Park Service eventually succeeded in their fight to build
this new roadway in the Great Smoky Mountains.

But in doing

so, they were acutely aware of the power of the
environmental groups against them and the force of
legislation which threatened their autonomy.

To combat

this, the succeeding NPS Master Plans for the parks were
prepared "behind closed doors."62
The Impact of the Leopold Report
Ironically, while the Wilderness Act proceeded to
estrange the Park service even farther from the thinking of
many environmentalists, the Leopold Report brought them
closer together.

The Park Service was quick to accept the

60National Parks and Conservation Association,
Preserving Wilderness in our National Parks, (Washington,
o.c.: National Parks and conservation Association, 1971) p.xvi.
61Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation,
p.149.
62A.W.S., "Wilderness in the Parks", National Parks
Magazine, October, 1965, p.2.
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Leopold Report, not only because of the pressure brought on
by the environmentalists, but because it provided the Park
Service with an excuse to instigate change.

The Park

Service's approach to wildlife management had traditionally
been less than scientific.

By the sixties, NPS was

realizing tremendous wildlife management problems, most
notedly in Yellowstone National Park, and any move toward
new solutions was welcomed.
In 1968, Director Hartzog published the Green, Red, and
Blue books which elaborated on new policies for the parks
which corresponded with the management plans recommended by
the Leopold Committee.

Natural primitive parks were to be

managed:
... so as to conserve, perpetuate, and portray as a
composite whole the indigenous aquatic and terrestrial fauna
and flora and scenic landscape. Management will minimize,
give direction to, or control those changes in the native
environment and scenic landscape resulting from human
influences or natural processes of ecological succession.
Missing native life forms may be reestablished, where
practicable. Native environmental complexes will be
restored, protected, and maintained, where practicable, at
levels determined through historical and ecological research
of plant-animal relationships. Non-native species may not
be introduced into natural areas. Where they have become
established ... an appropriate management plan should be
developed to control them.63
Thus, the parks were to be returned to a "vinaigrette

63National Park service, Administrative Policies for
Natural Areas of the National Park System, (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968) p.17 as reprinted in
Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p.39.
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of primitive America."

And yet, while the Leopold committee

recognized that parks were not complete ecosystems, Hartzog
directed that they were to be managed as if they were.

What

is important, he stated, is "the concept of preservation of
a total environment as compared with the protection of an
individual feature or species."64

This policy, very similar

to the one proposed by V.E. Shelford in the 1930's, came to
be dubbed as "ecosystems management."
For parks, such as Yellowstone, ecosystems management
was to have a profound effect on their policies towards
regulating wildlife.

While park management had evolved from

a period of non-management (1872-1930) to a period of active
management (1930-1968), it seemed as if non-management,
under the guise of scientific ecology, was in vogue again.·
As discussed earlier, Yellowstone NPS officials had
been artificially controlling the northern range elk herd by
shooting a number of them annually since the 1930's.
Artificial control

seeme~

the best way to avoid an ungulate

population irruption seeing as the park itself was not a
complete ecosystem.

However, in 1960, the NPS elk shootings

were publicized on television.
outra~ed

Environmentalists were so

that they brought the issue before Congress.

Senate Hearings in 1967, there was a great deal of

64Ibid.
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controversy "over just what elk management in Yellowstone
was expected to accomplish."65
The elk controversy put the NPS in a catch-22 position
in the late 1960's.

Park biologists firmly believed there

were too many elk for the land to support, yet, public
outrage over the elk shoots was costing them public support.
Fortunately, Hartzog and his new "Leopold" management
directives were being issued at this time.

The NPS

interpreted these new policies to mean that parks could be
left alone to manage themselves, although the Leopold
Committee specifically commended the elk shooting in the
park as an appropriate means of control.

Regardless a new

experiment was begun in Yellowstone: that of natural
regulation.

The elk populations, park scientists argued,

would take care of themselves.

Even though the elk no

longer had any natural predators in Yellowstone, save for
the grizzly bear, the elk populations, nevertheless, would
naturally stabilize.
In other parks, mainly McKinley in Alaska And Isle
Royale in Lake Superior, the new "ecosystems management"
policy had a much better chance of success.

In these parks,

lack of NPS staff had, in effect, put natural regulation in

65Don Despain, Douglas Houston, Mary Meager, Paul
Schullery, Wildlife in Transition, (Boulder: Robert
Rinehart, Inc., 1986) p.25.
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practice a long time ago.

Populations of predators and prey

appeared to live in balance and "by these two populations
being together the vegetation habitat is conserved."66

In

Yellowstone, the overgrazing of range land had shown that no
"biotic whole" existed as such.
The Impact of the Concessions Act
The changes in the law governing park concessions made
concessions very appealing to corporations.

Almost

overnight, small family operations ... were bought out by
conglomerates."67

These were corporations who were often

running operations in several parks while concessions were
only a small part of their business.68
The new conglomerates quickly expanded concession
operations in order to accommodate the ever increasing
numbers of tourists in the parks.

But as they invested

millions of dollars in concession operations, they also
endeavored to ensure that their investment would be
protected.

corporate concessions began to exert a much

greater voice in park management than their predecessors
had.

The Concessions Policy Act of 1965 protected their

66F. Fraser Darling and Noel D. Eichhorn, "Man and
Nature in the National Parks: Reflections on Policy",
National Parks Magazine, p.20.
67Zaslowsky, These American Lands, p.41.
68Fred B. Eiseman, Jr. "Who Runs the Grand canyon?",
Natural History, March, 1978, p.83.
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right to do so.
conclusion
By the close of the 1960's, numerous pieces of
legislation impacting on park management had been
ratified.69

Clearly, Congress was exerting its influence on

park management as was Secretary Udall and the
environmentalists.

Conservation was politically popular in

the New Frontier and Great Societies.

NPS and the parks

were also affected, however, by the nationwide
environmental movement coming to fruition in the early
1960's.
Under the mandates of the new legislation, the new
public interest in the parks, and the administration of
Secretary Udall, it was clear that the Park Service would
never enjoy the same degree of autonomy as it had prior to
the beginning of the decade.

Hartzog had tried to restore

some of the autonomy to the parks by shifting much of the
park management
level.

decision~making

down to the individual park

He had also moved to lessen the public response to

park Master Plans as a reactionary measure.

But neither

plan of action restored the Park Service's autonomy that
they had lost.
Hartzog and the Park service were fortunate in the

69Hummel, stealing the National Parks, p.248.
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1960's, however to have the support of the secretary of the
Interior and his staff in their congressional battles.
Secretary Udall was very much concerned with the parks and
worked closely with Hartzog on park policies.

While the

Park Service was unenthusiastic about the new laws as they
dictated to some extent future park management directives,
nevertheless, they were not out of line with the policy
directives that the Park Service had created and
implemented themselves.

I
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Chapter IV

Congressional influence over the federal bureaucracy
was expanded between 1960-1980 generally as a result of
burgeoning congressional staffs accompanied by the support
of an enlarged congressional Research Off ice and General
Accounting Office.

Congressional control over the Park

Service was to be enlarged by two additional factors as
well.

The first was "the reluctance of recent Presidents to

make use of the 1906 Antiquities Act".1

Without

Presidential initiative, the Park service became reliant on
laws enacted by congress for expansions and improvements.
secondly, the low priority of NPS in Nixon's administration
agenda transferred much initiative to congress.

Fortunately

for the national parks and the National Park service, there
was an NPS Director in place who was willing and able to
take a stand in congress.
Director George Hartzog and congress
From the time he was appointed as Director in 1964,
George Hartzog made it a practice to make "courtesy calls''
to all key congressional members.2

He was very much aware

lForesta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.75.
2George Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks,
(New York: Moyer Bell Limited, 1988) p.118.
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of the power Congress held over the Park service.

Thus, he

made it a point to know the people that held the authority
to preserve the parks.

In addition to personal visits,

Hartzog also led tours of the nearby parks for congressional
members which he used as an opportunity to discuss park
policies.

Hartzog made sure all

members of Congress had

reason to take note of these discussions.

He made it clear

that the establishment of parks represented tangible
benefits to constituents.
sage advice.

congress duly reacted to his

With the establishment of the National

Wilderness Preservation system (1964), the National Trails
System (1968), the Historic Preservation System (1966), and
the Wild and scenic Rivers System (1968) there was an NPS
administered tract of land in every congressional district.3
Pork barrel parks had come of age.
Director Hartzog and President Nixon
While Hartzog had become a popular and well respected
figurehead within the NPS and on the Hill by the 1970's, he
was not popular with President Nixon.

When rumors leaked

from the White House in 1969 that Hartzog would be replaced,
"congressmen and senators heated up in sufficient numbers to
evaporate the rumor."4

Hartzog, nevertheless, only remained

3Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.138.
4John McPhee, "Profiles--George Hartzog", The New
Yorker, September 11, 1971, p.42.

127
a part of the Nixon Administration until 1972.

Upon the

reelection of President Nixon in 1971, Hartzog was fired.
some park critics argue that NPS lost control of the Park
service with his dismissal.
Nixon replaced Hartzog with Ronald Walker, "a White
House staff aide who knew nothing about either agency
administration or national parks."5

Totally "unfamiliar

with park operations, Walker's appointment dismayed the
career employees, loyal park service alumni and the citizen
conservation organizations."6
inexperience,

As a result of walker's

secretary Rogers Morton asked Assistant

Secretary Nathanial Reed to oversee NPS matters.
instead wound up running the Park service.

Reed

Fortunately, for

the parks and NPS, Reed "was an environmentalist and he took
a personal hand in ensuring that the agency managed the Park
system in accord with the Wilderness Act and the National
Environmental Policy Act."7

His actions "did not

significantly disrupt park policy or operations."8
While Reed managed the parks in an ecologically
5Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.85.
6Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.263.
?Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.85.
8Robert and Patricia Cahn, "Disputed Territory",
National Parks, p.30.
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sensitive manner, it was clear that the NPS was not in
control of itself.

Even after Director Morton resigned in

January 1975 and was replaced by a well-liked NPS careerman,
Gary Everhardt, the power of the director was not restored.
Reed continued to "dabble in day-to-day operational
management" while his assistant became the associate
director for National Park service legislation.9
The Interior Department was not the only usurper of NPS
control, however, during the early seventies.

A second

major influence on the Park service was the revived Office
of Management and Budget (OMB).

Nixon's OMB gave him and

later presidents a cadre of loyal men who had the ability to
control agency budgets.

consequently, the OMB was able to

control agency policies.

OMB also permitted the President

and staff to play a greater role in park management.
OMB and NPS
From its inception, OMB argued that the Park Service's
problems "could be solve.a through greater management
efficiency. 11 10

This translated into a "no-growth policy 11

for the Park service.11

As OMB Associate Budget Director

9Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.264.
lO"Anecdotes & Alibis & OMB", National Parks and
Conservation Magazine, June, 1976, p.19.
ll"Closing the Door on the National Parks'', National
Parks and conservation Magazine, January, 1975, p.23.
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James L. Mitchell noted, "park superintendents almost always
want more personnel and funds ... They will just have to do
the best job they can with what they get."12
In 1963, Glacier National Park in Montana had 72
permanent personnel and 261 seasonals to help the 800,000
annual visitors.

By 1975, Glacier had only 56 permanent

personnel and 273 seasonals to cope with 1.6 million annual
visitors.
jewels."

This was the scenario in many of the "crowned
While total national park visitation increased by

27 percent between 1971-1975, there was no significant
increase in park personnel.

congress "had authorized an

increase in permanent staff positions totaling seven
percent, from 7,925 to 8,491, but the Service never
~eceived

these increases."13

on March 1, 1974, the Park

Service summarized its situation:
As the service continues to spread manpower over
;;rreater numbers of areas ... maintenance, resource
nanagement, safety, and visitor services are not being
:onducted at prescribed standards.14
~oads

deteriorated in the parks along with visitor services.

\s Representative William Moorhead noted, "I can find no
12Mary Alice Kellogg, "The Shame of the National
?arks", Newsweek, May 10, 1976, p.70.
13"The crises in National Park Personnel", National
)arks and conservation Magazine, April, 1975, p.20.
14"The crises in National Park Personnel", p.20.
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other phrase to better describe the OMB's attitude toward
the existing conditions in the parks than that of
'thoughtless neglect'."15
During the same time period, NPS properties increased
seven percent.

Congress was clearly much more receptive to

the idea of aiding and expanding the system than was the
OMB.

Pork barrel parks that were created included urban

parks in New York and San Francisco in addition to Big
Thicket National Preserve in Texas and Big Cypress National
Preserve in Florida.

These tracts were definitely not on

the scale of the "crowned jewels" of the system, but they
were important nevertheless.
The leader on national park matters in the 95th
Congress was Representative Philip Burton, Chairman of the
House subcommittee on conservation, Energy, and Natural
Resources.

Burton realized that a healthy environment was

indicative of a healthy society.

Yet, Burton was "also an

astute politician who realized that parks, because of their
distributive value, were good bargaining chips and that
therefore his subcommittee had control of a powerful
political currency."16

under Burton, the subcommittee made

a vigilant search for new park additions.

In their efforts

15Mary Alice Kellogg, "The Shame of the Parks", p.70.

p.eo.

16Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
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to acquire more additions, they convinced congress in 1976
to pass legislation that established the "park-of-the-month
club."17

This legislation ensured that the subcommittee had

a continuous list of park proposals for the committee to act
on.
While congress took an interest in the parks in the
early seventies, the Nixon and Ford administrations did not.
Their arguments against the Park service had a basic
reoccurring theme: "the need for decentralization of
government, complex management

and acquisition problems,

emphasis on state, local, and private efforts; and the
scarcity of federal dollars."18

The Park service had been

hopeful that President Ford would take more of an interest
in the parks as he had been a former ranger in Yellowstone
National Park, but that did not prove to be the case.

Only

during his election campaign in 1975 did he visit the park
and promise $2.5 billion for the parks.19

Unfortunately,

his last minute efforts were viewed as campaign rhetoric.
Many asked, "why hasn't he done it before?"20
Pressing Issues for NPS
17Ibid., p.81.
18"Closing the Door on the National Parks", p.23.
19Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.264.
20James A. craig, "A Bully Pit", American Forests,
October 8, 1976, p.8.
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While personnel shortages and funding problems plagued
NPS continuously, there were two looming NPS issues that
begged to be resolved during the seventies.
was concessioner control in the parks.

The first issue

While the

Concessions Act of 1965 had established ground rules for
concession operations, it also created new problems.

The

second issue was the fate of the wild, mineral rich Alaskan
public lands.
Concession Control of the Parks
As a result of the Concessions Act of 1965, many family
run concession operations in the parks were bought out by
large corporations as the law made it advantages for them to
do so.

For many of these large corporations, "business

goals of seeking the maximum profit ... penetrated the
National Park service planning process and ... led to the
promotion of national parks as amusement parks rather than
areas to be preserved."21
the Park Service

desire~

For example, in the early 1970's,
to phase out overnight lodging

facilities in Zion and Bryce National Parks.

Being

relatively small parks, the Park Service felt it would be
more environmentally advantageous to return the land to its
natural state.

However, the concessioner, TWA, publicly

fought this plan and eventually won out.

In a report issued

2l"Corngress Blasts NPS", National Parks and
Conservation Magazine, p.25.
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by Congress in 1976, the subcommittee on conservation,
Energy, and Natural Resources found that concessionaires had
"a disproportionate degree of influence in relation to the
general public in the preparation of Master plans for the
national parks."22
To combat concessioner control of the parks, congress
released a report calling for reform of NPS policies
relating to concessionaires.

NPS argued however, that they

were powerless to act due to staffing shortages and
inadequate funding.

As was noted, there were 300

concessionaires operating in the parks while the NPS staff
overseeing their operations consisted of thirty people.23
At the same time, however, OMB ordered the Director to
abolish "all authorized permanent NPS positions that were
unfilled as of December 31, 1975."24

The problem of

concessioner control remained unresolved.
The Alaska Lands Issue
The second issue facing NPS was the Alaska lands issue.
NPS had proposed that certain tracts of land in Alaska be
set aside as national parks and monuments in compliance with
22Ibid.
23Ibid.
24"Another OMB Budget Trick", National Parks and
Conservation Magazine, May, 1976, p.26.
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the Alaska Claims Settlement Act of 1971.25
were also rich in minerals and oil.

But these lands

As a specialist with

the Interior Department noted, these lands have "very high
scenic value, very high mineral value--classic war."26
The Alaska Claims Settlement Act of 1971 gave land and
federal funds to native Alaskans.

It also gave the Interior

Secretary the option to withdraw all Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) lands for study and possible
reclassification.

The Secretary could classify these lands

as national parks or monuments, national wildlife refuges,
scenic rivers, or national forests.

Within "five years of

the Secretary's recommendations, Congress was directed to
establish the areas directly and set their boundaries."27
In December, 1973, Secretary Rogers Morton recommended that
83 million acres be set aside and reclassified.

By 1976,

Congress had not taken any action while more mining claims
were being staked on these lands.28
Environmental groups_ took on the challenge of securing
the Alaska lands, arguing they were "America's Last
25"Closing the Door on the National Parks", National
Parks and Conservation Magazine, January, 1975, p.24.
26"The Alaska Lands Issue: Our Last Frontier",
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1977, p.671.
27"The Alaska Lands Issue: Our Last Frontier", p.671.
28"The Mining of America's National Parks", National
Parks and conservation Magazine, January, 1976, p.20.
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Frontier".29

They submitted their own requests for land

acquisitions in Alaska; acquisition requests that were far
greater than either the Administration or the Department of
the Interior had expected.

Securing Alaska's lands was to

be their primary mission in the late 1970's.
Considering the problems facing the parks by 1976, one
would wonder why the public did not respond with more force.
After all, the environmental movement begun in the 1960's
was alive and well in the 1970's.

Richard Sellers, a

National Park Service historian, argues the general public
did not respond because they did not comprehend the
ramifications of these issues.

As he notes,

Despite the environmental movement of the 1960's and
1970's, facade management based largely on aesthetic
conditions is still acceptable to many people. Pretty
scenery creates an impression of biological health and
provides such overwhelming satisfaction that the general
public gives little more than cursory consideration to ...
greater ecological complexes. Few visitors can recognize
when certain animal populations are too great or too
small ... And even when human-caused ecological damage is
explained ... , the new conditions are often accepted as
simply 'another change in.scenery. '30
The carter Years
When James Earl Carter, an acknowledged
environmentalist, succeeded Ford in 1977, many believed the
29"Half of Park System unprotected until Congress acts
on Alaska", National Parks, February, 1980, p.24.
30Richard West sellers, "Not Just Another Pretty
Facade", The Washington Post, April 9, 1989.
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Park service would regain its independence and self respect.
However, even under this new leadership, NPS was unable to
regain control.

The Interior Department and Congress

continued to extended a heavy hand in management.
Under Carter, Robert Herbst became the new Assistant
Secretary in charge of the national parks.

Like Reed,

Herbst was an environmentalist and committed to
conservation.

Like Reed, Herbst, worked under a Secretary,

Cecil Andrus, who was also an environmentalist but did not
have time to delve into park affairs.

Herbst, like Reed,

was also interested in running the parks. As one insider
noted,

11

Reed ran the Park Service with Walker as director

and when Herbst came in he saw this and decided to do the
same."31
Director Gary E. Everhardt, who had replaced Walker at
his retirement as Director in 1975, was replaced by William
Whalen in 1977. Whalen, a young career NPS administrator,
lacked agency confidence .. This lack of support for the new
Director allowed Assistant Secretary Herbst to run the show
with Whalen concentrating on day to day management.

It was

Herbst who introduced park policies and implemented them
with help from friends in Congress.
Assistant secretary Herbst worked closely with
31Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p.86.
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Representative Burton on park legislation.

Like Burton,

"and most of the other leaders of the environmental
movement, his views of the Park System were expansionist; he
took a broad view of the types of units which should be
included in it and he was little concerned with conventional
national park standards."32 Herbst was not concerned that
national park appropriations were not keeping pace with NPS
acquisitions.

Rather, he argued, "as new park

authorizations built a large enough demand for
appropriations in the House, the problem would take care of
itself .33
Assistant Secretary Herbst worked closely with
Representative Burton and their efforts paid off.

on

October 12, 1978, the largest park bill in history was
passed, providing for more that 100 parks and preservation
projects in 44 states.34 While it authorized many
ecologically important park expansions, the legislation was
dubbed the "park barrel bill" because it impacted so many
states.

As Senator Robert Dole noted, "is there any state

other than Kansas that did not end up with a park?"35
32Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers,
p. 86.

33Ibid., p.86.
34"0mnibus Parks Bill", congressional Quarterly
Almanac, 1978, p.704.
35"0mnibus Parks Bill", p.705.
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However, no one would dub the 95th Congress the
Environmental Congress.

It "sustained the President's veto

of ... (a) ... pork-barrel public works appropriation bill
with its environmentally damaging water project ... (and) ...
it failed to act on the Alaska lands measure."36
Resolution of the Alaska Lands Issue
When the 95th Congress failed to take action on the
Alaska lands issue, President carter took the initiative in
December of 1978 and declared seventeen national monuments
in the state.

The action gave many of the debated Alaskan

wilderness areas federal protection.

But carter's action

was only intended to force Congress to act on the issue.
The imposed national monument status was "a temporary
stopgap insurance so that Congress--instead of development
interests --could decide their fate."37
It was the first time a President ever used the powers
granted to him under the National Monument Act for this
purpose.
After a long and bitter fight between environmentalists
and developers, on November 12, 1980 Congress agreed to

36Kathy Barton, "Parks and Wilderness", Environment,
November, 1978, p.37.
37"Half of Park system unprotected until Congress acts
on Alaska", p.24.
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restrict development on 104.3 million acres in Alaska.38

Of

that acreage, 43.6 million acres were set aside as national
parks.
This one piece of legislation alone increased the NPS
land holdings by one third.

For the Park service, the real

challenge came after the legislation had been passed.

As

NPS Regional Director John E. Cook noted, in Alaska,
There'll be more acres per ranger ... than this agency
has ever known before, and those will contain some of the
most sensitive natural systems on earth. Add to this the
management of mining claims, long-standing subsistence
activities--and visitors already showing up--and we have a
challenge that calls for the most dedicated and able field
staff, and a support system that won't let them down.39
To provide for the additional staff and funding necessary to
keep the enlarged Park service operating, congress passed
the largest ever appropriation package for NPS.

While the

congressional appropriation was less than the Carter
administration had recommended, the Service nevertheless
received $468.5 million to administer the 323 units in the
national park system.40
Concessionaires' Role in Park Management
38"Congress Clears Alaska Lands Legislation",
congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1980, p.575.
39Joan E. Gidlund, "Challenges for Alaska's New
Parklands", National Parks in Crises, (Washington, D.C.:
National Parks and conservation Inc., 1982) p.141.
40"Interior Appropriations Cleared by Congress",
congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1980, p.179.
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While the Alaska Lands Issue was resolved by 1980, the
problem of concessions in the parks had not.

This problem

had primarily not been resolved as a result of the
tremendous influence the large conglomerate concessionaires
had on the Park Service.

Yet, by 1980, the issue had come

to a head in America's first national park, Yellowstone.

It

was a classic case illustrating the power of the
concessioner under the Concessioner Act of 1965.
Concessions Management in Yellowstone
Under the 1965 Concessions Act, the General Host
Corporation's possessory interest in Yellowstone gave them
''All incidents of ownership except legal title."41

General

Host agreed to maintain the buildings in a manner in which
they saw fit.

The Park Service was responsible to pay for

any additional physical improvements they desired.
Under this contract, General Host was able "to provide
and operate facilities and services which he deems desirable
for the accommodation of visitors" in compliance with Park
Service regulations.42

The government would receive a

percentage of concessioner's profits paid as a franchise fee
for the privilege of operating in the park.

Any fees

41Public Law 89-249, 89th Congress, H.R. 2091, October
9, 1965, "Relating to the Establishment of Concessions
Policies in the Areas Administered by National Park Service
and for Other Purposes".
42Ibid.
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collected from the concessioner were deposited in the united
states Treasury.
General Host moved to successfully operate concessions
in Yellowstone for a number of years.

Albeit, over time

their service to visitors began to lapse and by 1978, "the
situation was too dismal to ignore any longer."43

General

Host could no longer keep all hotel and dining facilities
open because they could not entice people to work for them.
Losses forced them to announce they would not "invest ... in
the refurbishment of the buildings because it could not be
guaranteed an adequate return."44

The Park Service

consequently decided to evict their management prior to the
expiration of their contract.

They received permission to

do so on November 10, 1978, under the omnibus Parks Act.45
Under the conditions of the Concessions Act of 1965,
the Park service was forced to buy General Host out of its
possessory interest in the park.

While the company had

failed to "comply with certain capital expenditure
requirements", the possessory interest made it very

43Zaslowsky, "Black cavalry of Commerce", p.30.
44Zaslowsky, "Black cavalry of Commerce", p.30.
45"0mnibus Parks Act", National Parks, January, 1979,
p. 27.
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difficult to remove them.46

After what prove to be a "long

and expensive battle", the Park service regained control of
the concessions in Yellowstone in 1981 at a cost of $19
million.47
The battle with General Host made it clear to the Park
service that reform was desperately needed in the area of
concessioner management.

The service was certain to

approach future contracts with trepidation.

Yet, because of

all the long-term contracts the Park Service held with park
concessionaires, reform would not take place overnight.
Hearings were led in Congress, but no imminent solution
appeared.
The Shift in control
By 1980, the Park system made some major strides in the

areas of land acquisition and funding during the late
seventies.

But while NPS gained in trusts, it lost in

independence.

This loss of independence occurred primarily

as a result of the rising power of Congress in tandem with
high-level Interior Department officials using "their
prerogative to influence park management."48

This influence

46"General Hosts Loses Yellowstone Park", New York
Times, April 26, 1980, p.6.
47"Yellowstone Plans Gives New Powers to Concessioner",
National Parks, September/October 1981, p.32.
48Cahn, "Disputed Territory", p.30
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could have been extremely detrimental for the parks'
ecological health and the public's enjoyment.

But

fortunately for both, park policy continued to be
environmentally sensitive as Assistant Secretaries Reed,
Herbst, and Representative Burton recognized that time was
not on the side of the environment.
In May of 1980, Director Whalen was fired.

secretary

Andrus stated he was dismissed because of "serious morale
and management problems in the service and because of Mr.
Whalen's poor health."49

He was the fourth Director to be

fired within a span of ten years.

Prior to 1970, not one

park service director had been fired.SO
Many felt Whalen deserved to be fired.

He had allowed

the Bureau of outdoor Recreation to simply takeover many NPS
historic preservation programs without fuss.

This sudden

relinquishment undermined his credibility "both within the
Park Service and among its unusually loyal and active
alumni."51

A temper tantrum in the middle of a

concessioner' meeting sealed his fate as NPS director.52
49Philip Shabecoff, "Director ousted Over Problems in
Federal Parks", The New York Times, April 25, 1980, p.A15.
50Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.265.
51Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks.
52Shabecoff, "Director ousted over Problems In Federal
Parks",New York Times, April 25, 1980 p.Al6.
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To placate angry regional directors who were upset
about the loss of the preservation programs and the longterm lack of good leadership, Secretary Andrus asked them to
recommend a new director.
of their own.

Not surprisingly, they chose one

Russell Dickerson, the former Pacific

Northwest regional director became Director in the summer of
1980.
Conclusion
With Russell Dickerson as the new Director, the Park
Service felt confident it would regain the independence that
it had lost.

But loss of control had occurred gradually in

the past twenty years and it would not easily be won back.
Some critics argue this loss began with the firing of
George Hartzog, others argue that it began with Watt's
tenure.

I would have to agree with Ronald A. Foresta that

it actually began in the early 1960's when there began "a
wide spread sense that the agency was pursuing the wrong
goals."53

While the Park service was actively undertaking

"park improvement

11

projects under Mission 66, society was

calling for more preservation and less misuse of its
resources.

secretary Udall certainly believed it when he

took charge of park policy.

Environmental groups also

abandoned the Park Service at this time when they sent their
53Foresta, America's National Parks and Its Keepers,
p.90.
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lobbyist to congress to push for policy reforms. Instead of
working with NPS, they began to try to control them.

In

the 1970's, weak directors further contributed to NPS's
management problems. They allowed the Interior Department
and Congress to take over.

This left the parks much more

susceptible to political ebbs and tides.

But fortunately,

this shift in decision-making did not damage the parks.

In

the 1960's and 1970's environmental standards were
maintained, even if the Park Service was not in control,
thanks to key environmentalists in the Interior Department,
congress, and the Administration.

But future

administrations would show just how vulnerable the integrity
of the parks were under this shift in control.

L

Chapter v
By law, the Park service must maintain the parks "for
the enjoyment of future generations."1

While there has

never been any consensus as to how they should best
accomplish this task or what state the parks should be in,
the orientation of the Park Service has traditionally
dictated that use which distracts from the future enjoyment
of others should be eliminated.

Traditionally, they have

acted under this principle.
Even when the Park Service's independence began
eroding away, those in positions of authority continued to
follow this principle.

The parks were managed with a sense

of the organic mission.

They were protected for succeeding

generations while providing for the enjoyment of those
living now.

congress and the Department of the Interior

insured that the growing concern for our natural resources
was augmented by expansion of the national park system.
During the carter administration alone, total national park
acreage increased by one-third.
With the election of President Ronald Reagan and his
subsequent appointment of secretary of the Interior James
watt, however, management policies would change.

This

lPublic Law 65-235, as cited in United States statues
at Large, p.535.
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change initiated from the Reagan Administration's opposition
to federal restrictions on federal lands.
"unnecessary regulations",

To counter

Watt initiated policies that

were substantially different from those traditionally
implemented by the National Park service.2
The Department of the Interior's new goals combined
with the economic strategies of this administration departed
sharply from those established previously.

However, they

were part of a broader Reagan Administration strategy.
Within the Reagan Administration's "strategy of bureaucratic
control" was "its effort to pare down the federal budget and
bureaucracy by having state and local governments and
private business assume increasing responsibilities for the
provision of goods and services once provided by the federal
government."3

Reagan's goals for the bureaucracy, thus,

were somewhat similar to Nixon's.

However, Reagan was much

more successful at reorganizing the bureaucracy so as to
meet his agenda. Because.of the "high priority the President
and his aides assigned to White House control of personnel",
Reagan "achieved a degree of loyalty and coherence in the
bureaucracy that other Presidents (including Nixon) have
2Gundars Rudzitits and Jeffery Schwartz, "The Plight of
the Parklands'', Environment, December, 1982, p.8.
3Elizabeth sanders, "The Presidency and the
Bureaucratic state" as cited in Michael Nelson, The
Presidency and the Political System p.398.
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longed for."4

The consequences of this reorganization,

attention to personnel selection, and revamping of policy is
of great importance as it will last long after the end of
the Reagan administration.
Watt's hand in the National Park service
Watt was not new to the Department of the Interior in
1981.

Prior to 1981, he had served as head of the

Interior's Bureau of outdoor Recreation during the Nixon
Administration, an agency that frequently had pitted itself
against NPS over departmental acquisitions.
With the advent of secretary James Watt's appointment
as secretary of the Interior in 1981, the Department of the
Interior promoted an "antigovernment 'sagebrush rebellion'
philosophy and a tilt toward development and privitization,
which they aggressively sought to impose on the Park
service."5

secretary's watt's promised policy reforms ''time

and time again ... broke with the Department's traditional
role of preserving parklands. ",6

watt's plans for reform,

however, followed the Administration's theme that the
4Elizabeth
"Reagan and the
the Legacy", in
(Chatham, N.J.:

sanders as cited in Benda and Levine,
Bureaucracy: The Bequest, the Promise, and
Charles Jones, ed., The Reagan Legacy,
Chatham House Publishers, 1988) p.109.

5Robert and Patricia Cahn, "Disputed Territory", p.30.
6William c. Lienesch, "Interior: Behind the
Bureaucracy", National Parks, March/April 1984, p.29.
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"public

sector should be smaller and less intrusive, and

that the private sector should be strengthened and made more
influential."?

His drive was to maximize the involvement of

private businesses in the parks and this was certainly in
accord with the President's desire to strengthen ties with
the business community.a

While "Watt's views reflected

those of the Reagan administration and pro-development
interests that he represented from 1977 to 1980 as head of
the Mountain States Legal Foundation, some conservationists
have suggested that his appointment as secretary of the
Interior was like 'hiring a fox to guard the chickens.'"9
In order to carry out his plans with minimal
interference from NPS, Watt proceeded to remove "five of the
top-level managers in the park service."10

For example, he

removed the career deputy director, "replacing him with a
political loyalist inexperienced in park management and
7Richard P. Nathan, "The Reagan Presidency in Domestic
Affairs", as printed in Ed., Fred I. Greenstein, The Reagan
Presidency: An Early Assessment, (The Johns Hopkins Press:
Baltimore) 1983, p.50.
8Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, "The Presidency
and the organization of Interests", as printed in Ed.
Michael Nelson, The Presidency and the Political system,
(The Congressional Quarterly Inc.: Washington, D.C.) 1988,
p.323.
9Current Bibliography, 1982, p.431.
lORick Resse, Greater Yellowstone, No. 6, Montana
Geographic society, (Montana Magazine:Helena, MT) 1984,
p.98.
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lacking empathy for career park professionals."11

He also

demoted the Alaska regional director and forced another
regional director into retirement.

These men were "from the

Carter administration ... (and) ... were too committed to the
environmentalist views he opposed.''12

This move signalled a

"reversal of Interior's long-standing conservationist
stance, and in the ensuing atmosphere of uncertainty, there
was a noticeable deterioration of morale."13
Watt did announce early on that he would retain
Russell Dickerson as Director of NPS.

Dickerson shared

neither the same park philosophy nor management style and
critics argued Watt would have liked to replace Dickerson.14
Dickerson proved not to be any match for Watt, however.
under pressure, he allowed the secretary to set park policy
as his recent predecessors had.
Watt used the shift in power to his advantage.

The

secretary encouraged the President to appoint a number of
like minded political appointees to the positions of
undersecretary and Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife,
llGeorge Hartzog, "Raze Eyesores and Insulate
Director", The Wall street Journal, November 23, 1988,
p.A12.
12Current Bibliography, 1982, p.433.
13Ibid., p.433.
14Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.268.
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and Parks.

With utilitarian-minded men such as Donald Hodel

and Ray Arnett in these respective positions, Watt was more
easily able to carry out his reforms.
Watt was aided by shifts in control within the
Department of the Interior that had occurred in the 1960's
and 1970's.

As the secretary and Undersecretary had taken a

greater role in park management since the early 1960's, Watt
was able to capitalize on this control in his own
policymaking.

Yet, in previous adrninistrati9ns, the

Secretaries and the Undersecretaries had worked with the
Park service officials.

watt would not.

This caused some

park critics to argue that "career park service officials
were no longer in charge as a result."15

Power struggles

were increasingly evident in the news after 1981 pitting the
political appointee posts of secretary of the Interior and
the Assistant Secretary of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks against
the professional career-personnel within the Park Service.
Watt's Plans for the Parks
After taking office, Watt immediately imposed a
moratorium on new park acquisitions.

He argued that the

government could not manage the lands they currently

15Ibid.

L

I

p. 98.

152
possessed.16

As he noted, a General Accounting Office

report completed in 1980 showed "a number of parks to have
substandard physical structures."17

The GAO had estimated

$1.6 billion would be necessary to make the essential
repairs.

Watt reacted by "calling park conditions

'shameful' and 'a disgrace,' and declared that no more money
should be spent on parkland acquisition on the grounds that
we should first take care of what we have."18

In an abrupt

reversal of policy, Watt abolished the Land and Water
Conservation Fund which had supplied money for park
acquisitions since 1964.19
Environmentalists were outraged at the moratorium.
Environmental organizations, such as the "Friends of the
Earth, the League of conservation Voters, the Wilderness
society, the National Wildlife Federation, the Isaak Walton
League, and the National Audubon society sought the removal
of watt from office."20

The Sierra Club alone lead a

16William MacDougall, "Crises Ahead in our National
Parks'', U.S. News and world Report, September 27, 1982,
p.75.
17Fred Powledge, "Toward the Twenty-first Century",
Wilderness, Spring, 1983, p.34.
18Ibid.
19George Hartzog, "Raze Eyesores and Insulate
Director", The Wall street Journal, November 23, 1988,
p.A12.
20Current Bibliography, 1982, p.434.
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national campaign to remove Watt, obtaining more than one
million signatures by October 1981 demanding his
replacement.21
A second goal of Watt's was to increase the role of
concessionaires in the parks while decreasing government
responsibility.

Even as park concessionaires had

historically functioned as "perpetual monopolies", Secretary
watt, with the support of President Reagan, promised more
far-reaching plans for them.22

watt would give "the

concessionaires a greater role in the management of natural
resources, even though they have absolutely no expertise in
this area."23

This was extremely disturbing news to NPS

officials who had felt for some time that the
concessionaires already had an undue influence on park
policy.

But Watt nevertheless persisted.

Addressing a

national convention of park concessionaires, he stated in
1981, "we will use the budget system to be the excuse to
make major policy decisions .... ('We seek') an aggressive
program with private entrepreneurs ... ('and if any member of
the National Park Service gives us a problem) ... We're going
21Ibid.
22Dyan Zaslowsky, "Black cavalry of Commerce",
Wilderness, Spring, 1983, p.26.
23Philip Shabecoff, "Administration Seeks Grater Role
for Entrepreneurs are Federal Parks", New York Times, March
29, 1981, p.1.
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to get rid of the problem or the personality, which ever is
fastest."24
Watt pushed for the privatization of park concession
operations to fulfill the Reagan Administration's promise
"to get the government off the backs" of American
businessman.25

Reagan insisted on "'contracting out'"

services in order to pare down the federal government's role
in economic affairs.26

The Reagan Administration was not

concerned with the environmental responsibility of the park
concessioner.

Rather, the Administration firmly believed

that "environmentalists had gone too far" in their demands
for environmental protections.27

With large corporations

controlling most concession operations by the 1980's, watt's
program of concession privatization promised them greater
freedom to expand operations, thus, maximizing corporate
profit.
watt's Plan for Development Near The Parks
A third goal of watt's was to make Forest Service and
24Ibid. p.Al.
25Richard Kazis and Richard Grossman, "The Future of
the Environmental Movement," in Alan Gartner, Colin Greer,
and Frank Riessman, eds., Beyond Reagan, (New York: Harper
and Row, 1984) p.210.
26Peter Benda and Charles Levine, "Reagan and the
Bureaucracy; The Bequest, the Promise, and the Legacy",
p.124.
27Ibid.
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BLM lands more accessible to timbering, mining and
exploration.

Again, this was done on the premise that

regulation was stifling the American man's opportunities
and economy.

While timbering and development was

encouraged outside of the national park boundaries, it
often were slated for areas that served as buffer zones for
parklands.28

As most of the parks, especially the "crowned

jewels", were not complete ecosystems, development in these
vital buffer zones jeopardized the integrity of the parks.
Watt's Programs in Action
Watt's opportunity to induce change in park management
came almost immediately in Yellowstone National Park.

Since

the summer of 1979, the Park Service had been negotiating
with a new concessioner, T.W. Services, over their contract
to operate Yellowstone's hotels and restaurants.

From the

administration's standpoint, the timing was right to
introduce major changes with respect to concession
operations.

The resulting agreement between T.W. services

and the Park Service, subsequently signed by Secretary Watt
on November 1, 1981, was "hailed by the administration as a
model of Reaganomics."29
28D. Leal, "Saving An Ecosystem, as cited in J. Baden,
A Yellowstone Primer: Policy Reform Via The New Resource
Economics, 1989, p.62.
29Alston Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, (Atlantic
Monthly Press: New York) 1986, p.226.
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Under this agreement, T.W. services was permitted to be
the sole operator of the hotels and restaurants within the
park.

Its only competitor within Yellowstone for the annual

two and a half million visitors' dollars was the longstanding, family-owned and operated, Hamilton's Photo Shops.
Thus, the federal contract offered T.W. Services the
traditional monopoly over concessions.

Yet, it also granted

them the privilege to operate the concession with no prior
investment in the park facilities, more commonly known as a
"possessory interest".30

T.W. services' minimal investment

subsequently translated into "minimal risk".31

As Don

Hummel, former Chairman of the National Park concessions
noted ... With no "possessory interest, no inventory, no
capital investments that might depreciate ... They were
practically guaranteed a profit."32
The unprecedented 1981 contract with T.W. Services also
allowed the Park Service in Yellowstone, for the first time
in history, to become "a.partner of private enterprise."33
The Park Service retained ownership of all concession
facilities while it required the concessioner to provide the
30Dyan zaslowsky, "Black cavalry of Commerce", p.28.
31Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p.226.
32Ibid.
33Ibid.

L_ -----------------------------------

157
funds for maintaining

them.

These funds, amounting to

"twenty-two percent" of T.W.'s annual gross revenues within
the park, were to be spent at the discretion of the Park
Service on capital improvements.34

As the amount of revenue

the Park service received on an annual basis varied in
accordance with the concessionaires profits under this
unprecedented agreement, the Park service now had an
economic interest in ensuring that the concessioner
profited.

Hence, there was a motivator, an unprecedented

economic one, for increasing concession operations.
The Administration's Role in the Park Buffer Zones
outside Yellowstone National Park, the Reagan
Administration appointees within the Forest service
encouraged increasing timber production on the seven
national forests that surround it.

Along with logging,

there was an "extensive road building campaign.''35

Between

1980-1986, hundreds of roads were plowed out in "critical
wildlife habitats."36
sedimentation problems.

The roads also contributed to
As the roads were plowed on steep

grades, the disturbance accelerated the rate at which
sediment was dumped into streams, thus destroying prime fish
34Ibid.
35D. Leal, "Saving An Ecosystem'', p.62.
36Ibid.
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habitat.
All of this work was done at a financial loss to the
federal government.

Between 1979-1984, "annual timber

program costs exceeded timber receipts in all seven of the
region's national forests."37

Yet, private logging

companies benefitted from the deficit timber sales.

Deficit

timber sales were also in accord with the Reagan
Administration's idea that private developers should have
more access to public lands regardless of the cost.
Profits and the Parks
To make parks more profitable for the private
concessioner, Watt supported a plan that would improve
visitor facilities within them.

In 1981, he unveiled

"PRIP", his Park Restoration and Improvement Program, and
requested $1 billion dollars for it.

PRIP would "restore

sewage systems, roads, buildings, and other facilities while
ignoring programs to protect natural resources."38

In 1981,

Congress authorized "$1 billion ... (for a) ... crash fix-up"
for all parks to be spent over a period of five years.39
While certainly PRIP provided much needed funds for visitor
37D. Leal, "Saving An Ecosystem", p.58.
38Robert and Patricia Cahn, Disputed Territory, p.30.
39Francis R. Brown, "National Parks Stagger As
Difficulties Grow While Budget Shrinks", Wall Street
Journal, November 29, 1985, p.1.
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facility improvements, many felt the funds were not offered
in a spirit of conservationism.

As one critic noted, "of

what value would Yellowstone National Park be with
beautiful, modern hotels and restaurants, high-standard
roads, modern administration offices and remodeled buildings
if it lacked free-ranging wildlife populations, naturally
functioning biosystems, clean air and water, and vast
stretches of unmolested lands?"40

As another park critic

agreed, "if the profit motive is allowed to dominate, the
beauty and sense of history our parks preserve will be
lost."41
To counter watt's plans for the parks, Congress took
action.

In reviewing the 1980 state of the Parks report

which cited air quality threats, water resource problems,
visitor overuse problems, and external development problems
in some parks, Congress moved to add "$7 million a year to
the NPS budget for a Natural Resources protection Program
(NRPP) ."42

This money was targeted toward projects to deal

with these identified threats.
even with the congressional aid.

But the threats persisted,
One of the most obvious

threats was visitor overuse.
40Rich Reese, Greater Yellowstone, p.96.
41Michael Frome, "Park Tourism as Big Business", P.16.
42Robert Cahn, "Taking a count of the Threats",
National Parks, July/August 1987, p.33.
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ParJ.: V1s1tat1on
Since the 1960's, there was a

boon in

~ubstantial

national park v1c1tat1on nationwide.

Pcbl1c 1ntorent 1n

wild lands translated into increar,ed v!s1tat1on.

Yet, an

total numbers v1sitinq the parks rose above four billion
annually by the late 1970's, the Park sorv1ce

roco9n1:~d

t~o

that the increaslnq UEe would threaten the park's natural
resources.

This

proble~

was especially evident 1n the

"crowned jewels".
In Yosemite, holiday traff lc caus('d conQest1on for
hours.

In the Grand canyon, the

planes from 42

co~pan1es

:oocl~Q

~ubl1~1ty

was distracted by

telcw the r1=.

And 1! ycu

wanted a chance to run the Colorado rap1dR, but wore not a
part of a concessioner tour, the wait was five yearn.
AI::ericans clearly were "lov1nq thc·1r parks to d<.'ath. •"3
In 1978, Congress had =oved to candate that the Pnrk
service set "visitor carry1n9 capac1t1en" 1n nn effort to
preserve and protect the parks.44

Y~t.

1t

w3~

3

the 1980's that both Secretary Watt and Director
chose to ignore.

As 01rector

parks serve their hi;hest

Dlc~ers~n ~ta:ed

pur~ose wh~n

probl~~

in

O!c~ers~n

1n 1991, "!he

they are uoed by an

43Robert Paul Jordan, ~w111 Success Spall Our Parks",
Haticnal Geographlc, July 1913, p.1.
44Paul c. Pritchard "7he :our Per~ent Solut1~n",
National Parr.r., t:o•:e::-ber/Oece=b'?'r 1997, p.5.
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many people as possible ... It is a cop-out to set a limit on
visitors."45

While park visitation continued to rise at a

rate of four-percent a year, any plans to implement park
carrying capacities were shelved.46

Any within the Park

Service who cared to contest this game faced demotion or
removal.
For environmentalists, however, it was not a problem
that could just be ignored.

Watt outraged them and his lack

of support nationwide found him under increasing pressure to
resign.47

He did so in the fall of 1983.

Watt was replaced

by William c. Clark.
Evaluating NPS under watt
Watt had not been popular either with the Park Service
or congress.

His eagerness to change park policies angered

both parties.48

Watt had been quick to reverse long range

programs for the parks, primarily by ignoring park programs
to protect natural resources.49

His unending loyalty to the

45Philip Shabecoff, "Administration Seeks Greater Role
For Entrepreneurs at Federal Parks", p.Al.
46Ibid.
47Joseph A. Davis, "resignation Pressure Grows As
Watt's GOP Support Ebbs", Congressional Quarterly, October
3, 1983, p.2068.
48Joseph A. Davis, "Resignation Pressure Grows as
watt's GOP support Ebbs'', Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,
October 3, 1983, p.2068.
49Cahn, "Disputed Territory", p.30.
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Administration frustrated both as well.
It is difficult to discern to what extent Watt was
circumventing Congressional intentions while altering park
policies.

The national parks emerge as an area today where

Congress affirms its intentions primarily at budget-making
time.

This leaves the Secretary of the Interior with a

great deal of decision-making authority by Congressional
default.

For example, in 1983, Watt, with the support of

senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) and senator Don Young (R-AK)
ordered Director Dickerson to transfer the NPS Alaska
regional director, his deputy, and the superintendent of
Glacier National Park because "they imposed restrictions on
tour-boat operators in Glacier Bay in order to protect
endangered humpback whales."50

This was not an issue

congress as a whole felt obligated to deal with, so the
decision fell to watt, spurred by two congressional
officials who served on NPS related committees and
subcommittees.
watt was commonly thought within the scientific
community to have been the worse thing that ever happened to
the national parks.

He opened border areas to development,

he ignored visitor overuse, and he gave concessionaires
power that rivaled that of NPS.

SOibid.
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utilitarian oriented, in keeping with the Reagan
Administration's ideals, but environmentally insensitive.51
His disregard for the national park ideal made him
extraordinarily unpopular with NPS, environmentalists, and
the public as a whole.
watt was especially unpopular within NPS because of his
reorganization of their decision-making infrastructure.

As

a_result of Watt's reorganization, professional NPS
directors and their director, "were being forced to accept
decisions they felt were inimical to the Service, made by
people who had never managed a park and whose outlook was
toward development.''52

This did little for NPS morale as

the professionals were forced to accept "policy changes of a
kind" that in the past the Park service had been able to
resist.53
Watt's decision to halt new park acquisitions, however,
was one policy that met with some support.

While

environmentalists were disappointed, others saw NPS as
becoming a collect-it-all agency similar to the General
Services Administration (GSA).

Many recognized that the

parks established in the past few decades were not on the
51Ibid.
52Robert Cahn, ''Takeover at the Park Service", National
Parks, March/April 1987, p.53.
53Ibid.
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level of the "crowned jewels" and they challenged their
merits as national parks.S4

Others saw the crumbling roads

and tarnished visitor facilities in the "crowned jewels" and
understood Watt's argument.SS

As the editor of the Los

Angeles Times noted, "Americans go to Yosemite for rest and
recreation, not to face the same crumbling environment that
they deal with at home."S6

But for an agency whose funds

had not increased in proportion with its acquisitions, it
was difficult to keep up.
After Watt
William Clark served as Secretary of the Interior
through February, 198S.

During his tenure, he "softened

many of Watt's stands, improved relations with Congress and
opened dialogue with environmental groups."57

Clark also

attempted to return some of the park policy making to NPS,
but his tenure was so brief that he really had very little
impact.
In February of 198S, Secretary Clark was replaced by
54Jay Matthews, "Political storm over a Precious
Wasteland", The Washington Post, April 21, 1987, p.A3.
S5Ted Gest, "Patches Show Up in the National Parks",
U.S. News and World Report, June 17, '985, p.70.
56Ed., "Blemishes on Yosemite", Los Angeles Times,
October 25, 1985.
S7"Hodel Replaces Clark", Congressional Quarterly
Almanac, 1984, p.346.
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Donald Paul Hodel, the former Undersecretary of the Interior
under Watt.

With the appointment of Hodel, "the watt agenda

quietly reappeared. 58
11

Without the flamboyant Watt, it

seemed his policies were gone, but in fact they were there,
alive and well under Hodel.
Hodel and NPS
Shortly after Hodel's administration began, Dickerson
retired under pressure from Hodel in March of 1985.

Yet,

Hodel "delayed choosing a new NPS director .. (and) in this
leadership vacumn, the regional directors moved to complete
the isolation of these territories from the control and
direction of the park service Washington office."59
Regional "directors and superintendents were now taking
orders from political bureaucrats in the office of the
assistant secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks."60
On May 19, 1985, William Penn Mott was appointed
Director.

He was not Hodel's first choice, but he was a NPS

careerman who had served.as Governor Reagan's Director of
California state Parks and Recreation.61

Immediately, he

set about trying to revamp NPS from its political problems
58Robert and Patricia Cahn, Disputed Territory,
May/June 1987, p.31.
59Hartzog, Battling for the National Parks, p.269.
60Ibid.
61Robert and Patricia Cahn, Disputed Territory, p.31.
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with the Department of the Interior.

He replaced the deputy

director Watt had appointed with a career NPS man, Denis
Galvin.

He also fired other political appointees as well,

but two, "Smith and Fitzsimmons simply moved 'upstairs' to
become assistants to the new Assistant secretary for Fish,
Wildlife and the Parks, William Horn.62

This put them "in a

position to give orders to the NPS director."63
The Chapman Controversy
The strength of the Secretary of the Interior was again
realized with the resignation of NPS western regional
director, Howard Chapman.

Upset with the Interior's

policies which repeatedly emphasized use over preservation,
Chapman had not seen eye to eye with Hodel on a number of
issues, including scenic flights over the Grand canyon.64
As a punishment, Assistant Secretary Horn ordered Mott "to
give Chapman a below-average rating and to transfer him or
to force him into early retirement".65
Mott refused to give Chapman a low performance rating.
62Ibid.
63Ibid.
64Ronald B. Taylor, "Policy at Heart of Feud Inside
U.S. Park Service", Los Angeles Times, February 5, 1987,
p.23.
65Ronald B. Taylor, "Park Service Official at Odds With
Hodel over Public use, Quits", Los Angeles Times, April 24,
1986 p, 1.
f
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Horn then took it upon himself to change Chapman's rating
and Chapman fought back by speaking out.

He testified

before House and senate subcommittees that his rating had
been altered.

For many, Chapman stood ''as a lighting

rod" ... (showing) ... the sort of manipulation that the
Administration has been pursuing with Park Service
professionals, intimidating them or removing thern."66
Horn also interfered with Mott's recommendations for
the senior Executive service (SES) and numerous appointments
to regional directors.

Mott, finally outraged at Horn's

interference, wrote
... If I am to be responsible for accomplishing your
policy directions, I must have the authority to organize and
fill key appointments within existing rules and
regulations ... your staff's initiatives on these delicate
matters were not discussed with me or my Deputy Director.67
However, Horn took no action and continued to interfere in
park policy.

He tried to put a official from the Fish and

Wildlife Service in charge of policy formation for NPS.
When Mott appealed to Hodel, he sided with Horn.

Finally,

the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, chaired by
Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) threatened to cut off Horn's

66Ibid.
67Robert Cahn, "Takeover at the Park Service", National
Parks, March/April 1987, p.53.
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paychecks if he did not return NPS policymaking to NPS.68
Director Hott was persistent and determined.

He pushed

to regain control over the Park Service's policy making.

It

was a unending fight with the Reagan Administration men and
Hodel and Horn within the Interior Department.

They felt

strongly that parks were areas of public recreation whereas
Hott struggled to move NPS toward preservation.
classic battle of use vs. preservation.

It was a

While Mott was

pushing for park extensions, curtailing oining in
ecologically sensitive border ares, and pollution control,
the Reagan Administration appointees were pushing for
development, private investment, and relaxing mining
regulations.69
Controlling NPS
To keep the service under control, the Administrat1on
proposed drastic cuts in the Park service budget.

For

P.eagan, "fewer people on the payroll meant "less meddlesome'
activity and fewer rules and regulations."70

Every year,

the Reagan Administrat1on proposed cuts that were countered
by congress.

Repeatedly, they appropriated more ooney for

68Howard H. Chapnan, "Adninistration's Record on
Hanagecent of Parks", Los Angeles Tines, June 20, 1987.
69Ed., "Hott's Grand Design", Los Angeles Tioes. June,
1987.
70Sanders, "The Presidency and the Bureaucratic State",
p.389.
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NPS than the Administration recommended.71

Even when Gramm-

Rudman was put into effect, Congress continued to
appropriate monies above and beyond those recommended by the
Administration.72

Nevertheless, NPS too was affected by the

across the board cuts, cuts NPS "had no flexibility in
making."73
While budget cuts were to be expected every year, user
fees went up.

In 1987 entrance fees in the "crowned jewels"

increased from $2 dollars per car to $5 dollars per care.
By the following summer, in Yosemite, the Grand canyon, and
Yellowstone, the entrance fee was $10 dollars per car.
Senior citizens and disabled persons still were admitted at
no cost.74
parks.

Yet, the increases in user fees did benefit the

In 1987, Director Mott convinced the OMB that fee

revenues should remain in the NPS budget rather than be
returned to the General Fund.

It was means of keeping the

71Joseph Davis, "Interior Funding provisions Renew
Offshore Leasing Bans", Congressional Quarterly, October 20,
1984, p.2750.
72Maura Dolan, "Interior Department Budget Knife Cuts
Wide, Deep", Los Angeles Times, January 17, 1986.
73Judith Havermann, "Mowing Down Park Services",
Washington Post, April 11, 1986, p.Al.
74Ed, "This Land Is Your Land?", Money, August 8, 1987,
p.16.
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parks financially solvent.75
Even with the Congressionally-granted increases in user
fees, the cost to visit a park was still incredibly low.
For the price of one movie ticket, a family could a acquire
a seven day permit to Yosemite.

The price of an annual

permit for Yellowstone National Park in 1988 was $15
dollars, the same price that it was in 1915.76

And a common

si9ht in any park was a retired couple, in a $20,000 motor
home, with a free park permit.

Retirees, who clearly had

the money to pay and could provide much needed revenue, were
exempt from any entrance or user fees.

While raising

entrance fees might have been publicly unpopular, it would
have aided the financially struggling parks and valued
their worth more accordingly.
Pressures on the Parks
Without adequate revenue and protective legislation,
pressures relating to overuse, boundary development, and
pollution continued to mount.

For example, visibility in

the Grand canyon was often decreased significantly from smog
emanating from a nearby power plant.

on the East Coast,

pollution levels in Maine's Acadia National Park often
75William Penn Mott, "The National Park System: Looking
Back and Moving Ahead", USA Today, May, 1987, p.27.
76John Baden, "free Markets can Protect The earth",
High country News, February 27, 1989, p.13.
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exceeded federal standards.

In 1981, NPS had gathered data

on important vistas in the parks and compiled a list of
those that should be protected in compliance with the Clean
Air Act.

But Hodel never submitted the list to the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Hodel rejected this

list arguing that it would "'provide a false sense of
security' and

'would not be good for the patks' ."77

The

provision to list important vistas for review under the
Clean Air Act expired December 31, 1985.78
Establishment of the Great Basin National Park
During the entire eight-year administration of Ronald
Reagan, only one new park was added to the system.
the Great Basin National Park in Nevada.

This was

Commercial

interests, particularly mining companies, had prevented
previous legislative attempts from passing in Congress, but
it was finally approved in 1986.79
The establishment of the Great Basin National Park was
not

a signal of change in the Interior Department's

unprecedented moratorium on parkland acquisitions.

Rather,

the park came about from a motion in Congress, led by
77Cass Peterson, "National Parks Not Always a Breath of
Fresh Air", Washington Post, July 8, 1987, p.Al7.
78Robert and Patricia Cahn, "Disputed Territory", p.31.
79Maura Dolan, "Great Basin National Park Bill sent to
President", Los Angeles Times, October 11, 1986.
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Nevada's congressional delegation.
farewell gift to Paul Laxalt."80

The park was sort of "a
It was also a

congressional reaction to national parks increasing
popularity.

Between 1980 and 1986, national park visitation

increased almost thirty percent, bringing millions more into
America's parks annually.81
The California Park controversy
Another proposed land acquisition of great interest was
a section of desert in southern California.

The proposed

Mojave National Park was a pet project of Senator Alan
Cranston (D-CA).82

Environmental groups aided him in the

challenge to have this tract of land reassigned from BLM to
NPS.
The East Mojave desert is truly one of the last
wilderness areas in the United states.

With only unpaved

roads crisscrossing an area four times the size of
Yellowstone, it is not only expansive but also difficult to
navigate.

The area contains the world's largest Joshua tree

forest and some of the most valuable Anazazi Indian ruins
known.

And much of it is unexplored.

The area also

80T.R. Reid, "Great Basin Park A first For Reagan",
Washington Post, August 15, 1987, P.Al.
81Ibid.
82Jay Mathews, "Political Storm Over a Precious
wasteland", The Washington Post, April 21, 1987, p.A3.
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contains 750 species of wildlife, including bighorn sheep
and many species of endangered birds.83
But the East Mojave desert is also valuable for the
minerals it contains and much of it is leased out to local
ranchers for cattle grazing.

Neither industry nor the local

ranching community supported the park idea.

Rock collectors

and off the road vehicle owners did not support the idea
either as they saw NPS status as limiting access to the
area.84

Hodel did not support it and congress, in a time of

budget cutting, did not support the idea either as they were
not willing to take on such a potentially large expense.
The Yellowstone Fires- 1988
The Reagan Administration rounded out its tenure in
office with the oldest national park in flames.

While the

uncontrollable fires were controversial in themselves, in
the midst of coming to grips with them, the media also
unfolded the power struggle between the Interior Department
and the National Park Service.

While the media showed the

scientific ideals of "ecosystem management" was on shaky
ground, they also portrayed a Park service on shaky ground
as well as it could not put the fires out.

As the extent of

83Scott Armstrong, "Debate getting hot over future uses
of vast California desert", Christian Science Monitor,
January 16, 1987, p.3.
84Jay Mathews, "Political Storm Over A Precious
Wasteland", p.A3.

174
control the Reagan men in the Interior Department had on NPS
was better understood, critics started calling for an
independent NPS.
Robert Cahn was one of the first to promote the idea of
an independent NPS.

As he stated, "in the long run ... the

only way to assure minimal political interference with the
National Park Service is to remove it from the Department of
the Interior and establish it as an independent agency."85
Howard Chapman, who had been forced out of his job as the
NPS regional director echoed his sentiments in January of
1988.

As he noted,

The Hodel/Horn team has shown that they will do
anything to advance their cause of use. The only force that
has been able to shut them down is Congress. Clearly, the
National Park Service has to get into a position where it
has a greater ability to stand its ground against such
adversity as presented now by the Interior Department.86
It is an issue that has come up before Congress, and while
unresolved, will be certain to appear again should the
political condition established under the Reagan
Administration persist.

85Robert and Patricia Cahn, "Disputed Territory'', p.33.
86Howard Chapman, "Separate status for the Park
Service", National Parks, January/February 1988, p.46.

conclusion

Since its inception in 1916, the Park Service has
struggled with its "equivocal mission" of both preserving
the parks and providing for their use.1

At times when they

have desired to encourage public use, they have emphasized
park development.

Other times have marked them as the

prudent park protectorate as they have removed established
facilities and banned practices considered to be
inappropriate in a national park.
By law, the Park Service must maintain the parks "for
the enjoyment of future generations."2

While there has

never been any consensus how they should best accomplish
this task or what state the parks should be in, the
orientation of the Park service has traditionally dictated
that use which detracts from the future enjoyment of others
should be eliminated.

Historically, they have acted under

this principle.
Any apparent emphasis of either preservation or use
over time, as evidenced in Park Service policy, normally can
be traced to "lobbying power" influences emanating from
lAlston Chase, "How to save Our National Parks",
Atlantic Monthly, July, 1987, p.36.
2Public Law 65-235, as cited in United states Statues
at Large, p.535.
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resources over park development.

They adhered to the Park

Service's mission as established in the enabling
legislation.

watt, however, did neither.

Watt, rather, was one of Reagan's political appointees
who was chosen for his ability to be a "team player" and
carry out Administration initiatives.6

Watt's mission was

to transform the Administration's initiatives into agency
directives rather than follow the traditional mission of the
agency.

He received support for his efforts not from the

agency he managed, but rather from Reagan's Cabinet.7
The economic strategies of the Reagan administration
brought about park polices that departed sharply from those
of the last two decades.

Reagan's economic strategies were

radically altered in an effort to reverse a "decade of
economic 'stagflation' ."8

For NPS, it meant privatization

of many public services and loss of agency independence.
In the case of the Park Service, the Reagan
Administration also demonstrated that it could reshape
"policy and the modus operandi" of an agency.9

Unlike

6Benda and Levine, "Reagan and the Bureaucracy: The
Bequest, the Promise, and the Legacy", p.107.
7Ibid., p.110.
8Ibid., p.102.
9Elizabeth Sanders, "The Presidency and the
Bureaucratic state'', Ed., Michael Nelson, The Presidency and
the Political System, (Congressional Quarterly: Washington,
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previous Administration, the Reagan team replaced career men
with political appointees who had a like-minded attitude
toward park management as did the Reagan Administration.
This was done in the belief that "if you are going to run
the government, you've got to control the people that come
into it."10

Any one who.did not agree with the changes made

in park management by these like-minded political
appointees, including the Director of NPS, was simply
removed or harassed into retirement.
The Reagan Administration also tried to control the
Park Service through budget cuts.11
administrators and fewer regulations.

Less money meant fewer
The Reagan

Administration was not too successful in bringing about the
massive cuts it envisioned because Congress controlled the
budget.

Congress, in recent decades, had become allies with

the Park Service primarily because of the positive public
image the national parks portrayed.
The new policies implemented for the national parks
under the Reagan Administration were profit-oriented and
designed to give private interests a greater role in park
D.C.) 1988, p.379.
lOBenda and Levine, "Reagan and the Bureaucracy: The
Bequest, the Promise, and the Legacy", p.108.
llMaura Dolan, "Interior Department Budget Knife cuts
Wide and Deep", Los Angeles Times p.Al.
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management.

Private business was the "beneficiary, and the

federal bureaucracy (was) the target."12

It was another

"aspect of the Administration's divestment strategy."13
Watt looked for government activities within the parks that
could be more efficiently performed by the private sector.
Thus, concessionaires were given greater freedom to
establish operations in parks.

To help the concessioner,

visitor-use quotas were abandoned and development within the
parks was encouraged.
Using the criteria established by Lawrence E. Lynn in
"The Reagan Administration and the Renitent Bureaucracy", it
appears that the Park service's extensive change during the
Reagan Administration was not unique.14

Rather, changes

that took place in the Park service also took place in other
agencies such as the Employment and Training Administration
(ETA), the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture
(FSDA), and the Federal communications commission (FCC).
This change came about as a part of a broader plan that the
Reagan Administration had for the federal bureaucracy.

Many

12Sanders, "The Presidency and the Bureaucratic state",
p.399.
13Ibid., p.399.
14Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr. "The Reagan Administration and
the Renitent Bureaucracy'', The Reagan ~residency and the
Governing of America, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute
Press) 1985.
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agencies and their administrative appointees under the
Reagan Administration had two primary aspects in common.
Like the Park Service Directors Watt and Hodel, the agency
head "appeared to reflect Reagan's philosophy and intentions
in making appointments to subcabinet positions."15
Secondly, like watt and Hodel, other agency heads "promoted
Reagan's conservative ideology ... dutifully executed
administration policies concerning budget and staff
reductions, and ... formulated specific goals consistent with
Reagan's general policies."16
The policies for the parks as established under the
Reagan Administration were not new, however.

They were very

similar to those emanating from Park service Director Steven
Mather in 1916.

Mather also encouraged development,

visitation, and recreation in the parks.

But Mather

followed the principle that use which distracts from the
future enjoyment of others should be banned.
did not.

Watt clearly

Mather also set park policy in a different era.

In 1916, for example, approximately 21,000 people visited
Yellowstone annually.

Today, approximately 21,000 people a

week witness an eruption of Old Faithful.

use has increased

tremendously, yet, Watt did not encourage any protective
15Lynn, "The Reagan Administration and the Renitent
Bureaucracy", p.344.
16Ibid., p.344.
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measures to compensate.
Another significant difference between the Mather era
and the Watt era is that under Mather, the Park Service
created and implemented park policy.

Under Watt, the

Administration's economic policies were imposed on NPS.

The

Director had little or no say in the policies themselves.
By 1989, the Park Service was no longer in control of what
it was supposed to protect.
watt is not responsible for this Department's internal
shift in control.
gradually.

This shift in control came about

When Secretary Udall took over some of the park

policy making responsibilities from Director Hartzog in the
late 1960's, the shift in control was especially evident.
While Secretary Udall and subsequent Secretaries played a
major role in park policy-making, however, they did so in a
preservation-oriented manner.

For the most part, they

followed the principle that use which detracts from the
future enjoyment of others should be banned.
During Watt's tenure, he used this shift in authority
to the Administration's advantage.

Both Watt and Hodel were

able to make broad, sweeping changes in national park policy
because of the modus operandi that was in place.

While the

Reagan Administration worked to further channel the
decision-making into Interior's political appointees
positions, watt and Hodel were able early on to work toward
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internal restructuring because of the initial policy-making
set up.
watt's and Hodel's alterations in the areas of park
management and personnel helped the Reagan Administration
to accomplish its economic objectives.

What did this mean

for the Park Service and wildlands themselves?

For the

Park service, it meant lower employee morale and fewer
career employees.

Historically, short term political plans

have proven to be harmful to wildlands.

some examples are

the Hetch-Hetchy controversy, the Echo Park controversy and
the Yellowstone Park Grant Village controversy.

Many land

management decisions, once made, cannot be reversed.
Good land management requires long-range planning and
scientific expertise.

As America's "crowned jewels" stand

as a symbol to all of our nations' bounty and wealth, they
deserve just that.

They provide us with an opportunity to

view the past that cannot be replaced.

our responsibility

to tomorrow's heritage should not be forgotten.

Appendix A
Letter from Secretary Lane to Director Mather
as Reprinted in Report to the Secretary of the Interior,
1918

The administration policy to which the new service will
adhere is based on three broad principles: First that the
national parks must be maintained in absolutely unimpaired
form for the use of future generations as well as those of
our own time;second that they are set apart for the use,
observation, health, and pleasure of the people; and third,
that the national interest must dictate all decisions
affecting public or private enterprise in the parks.
Every activity of the Service is subordinate to the
duties imposed upon it to faithfully preserve the parks for
posterity in essentially their natural state. The commercial
use of these reservations, except as specially authorized by
law, or such as may be incidental to the accommodation and
entertainment of visitors, will not be permitted under any
circumstances.
In all of the national parks except Yellowstone you may
permit the grazing of cattle in isolated regions not
frequented by visitors and where no injury to the natural
features of the parks may result in such use. The grazing of
sheep, however, must not be permitted in any national park.
In leasing lands for the operation of hotels, camps,
transportation facilities, or other public service under
strict Government control, concessionaires should be
confined to tracts no larger that absolutely necessary for
the purposes of the business enterprises.
You should not permit the leasing of park lands for
summer homes. It is conceivable, and even exceedingly
probable, that within a few years under a policy of
permitting the establishment of summer homes in national
parks, these reservations might become so generally settled
as to exclude the public from convenient access to their
streams, lakes, and other natural features, and thus destroy
the very basis upon which this national playground system is
being constructed.
You should not permit the cutting of trees except where
timber is needed in the construction of buildings or other
improvements within the park and can be removed without
injury to the forests or disfigurement of the landscape,
where the thinning of forests or cutting of vistas will
improve the scenic features of the parks, or where their
destruction is necessary to eliminate insert infestation or
diseases common to forests and shrubs.
In the construction of roads, trails, buildings, and
other improvements, particular attention must be devoted
183
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always to the harmonizing of these improvements within the
landscape. This is a most important item in our program of
development and requires the employment of trained engineers
who either possess a knowledge of landscape architecture or
have a proper appreciation of the aesthetic values of park
lands·. All improvements will be carried out in accordance
with a preconceived plan developed with special reference to
the preservation of the landscape, and comprehensive plans
for future development of the national parks on an adequate
scale will be prepared as funds are available for this
purpose.
Wherever the Federal Government has exclusive
jurisdiction over national parks it is clear that more
effective measures for the protection of parks can be taken.
The Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over the
national parks in the States of Arkansas, Oklahoma, Wyoming,
Montana, Washington, and Oregon, and also the Territories of
Hawaii and Alaska. We urge the cession of exclusive
jurisdiction over the parks in other states, and
particularly in California and Colorado.
There are many private holdings in the national parks,
and many of these seriously hamper the administration of
these reservations. All of them should be eliminated as far
as it is practicable to accomplish this purpose in the
course of time, either through congressional appropriation
or by acceptance of donations of these lands. Isolated
tracts in important scenic areas should be given first
consideration, of course, in the purchase of private
property.
Every opportunity should be afforded the public,
wherever possible, to enjoy the national parks in the manner
that best satisfies the individual taste. Automobiles and
motorcycles will be permitted in all of the national parks;
in fact, the parks will be kept accessible by any means
practicable.
.
All outdoor sports which may be maintained consistently
with the observation of the safe guards thrown around the
national parks by law will be heartily indorsed and aided
whenever possible. Mountain climbing, horseback riding,
walking, motoring, swimming, boating, and fishing will be
favorite sports. Winter sports will be developed in the
parks that are accessible throughout the year. Hunting will
not be permitted in any national park.
The educational, as well as recreational, use of the
national parks should be encouraged in every practicable
way. University and high-school classes in science will find
special facilities for their vacation-period studies.
Museums containing specimens of wild flowers, shrubs, trees,
and mounted animals, birds, and fish native to the parks and

L__________

---------------
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other exhibits of this character will be established as
authorized.
Low-priced camps operated by concessionaires should be
maintained, as well as comfortable and even luxurious hotels
wherever the volume of travel warrants the establishment of
these classes of accommodations. In each reservation, as
funds are available, a system of free camp sites will be
cleared, and these grounds will be equipped with adequate
water and sanitation facilities.
As concessions in the national parks represent in most
instances a large investment, and as the obligation to
render service satisfactory to the department at carefully
regulated rates is imposed, these enterprises must be given
a large measure of protection, and generally speaking,
competitive business should not be authorized where a
co·ncession is meeting our requirements, which, of course,
will nearly as possible coincide with the needs of the
traveling public.
All concessions should yield revenue to the Federal
Government, but the development of the revenues of the parks
should ont impose a burden to the visitor.
Automobile fees in the parks should be reduced as the
volume of motor travel increases.
For assistance in the solution of administrative
problems in the parks relating both to their protection and
use, the scientific bureaus of the Government offer
facilities of the highest worth and authority. In the
protection of the public health, for instance, the
destruction of insect pests in the forests, the care of wild
animals, and the propagation and distribution of fish, you
should utilize their hearty cooperation to the utmost.
You should utilize to the fullest extent the
opportunity afforded by the Railroad Administration in
appointing a committee of western railroads to inform the
traveling public how to comfortably reach the national
parks; you should diligently extend and use the splendid
cooperation developed during the last three years among
chambers of commerce, tourist bureaus, and automobile
highway associations for the purpose of spreading
information about our national parks and facilitating their
use and enjoyment; you should keep informed of park
movements and park progress, municipal, county, and State,
both at home and abroad, for the purpose of adapting
whenever practicable, the world's best thought to the needs
of the national parks. You should encourage all movements
toward outdoor living. In particular, you should maintain
close working relationships with the Dominion parks branch
of the Canadian department of the interior and assist in the
solution of park problems of an international character.
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The department is often requested for reports on
pending legislation proposing the establishment of new
national parks or the addition of lands to existing parks.
Complete data on such park projects should be obtained by
the National Park service and submitted to the department in
tentative form of report to Congress.
In studying new park projects you should seek to find
scenery of supreme and distinctive quality or some natural
feature so extraordinary or unique as to be of national
interest and importance. You should seek distinguished
examples of typical forms of world architecture, such, for
instance, as the Grand Canyon, as exemplifying the highest
accomplishment of stream erosion, and the high, rugged
portion of Mount Desert Island as exemplifying the oldest
rock forms in America and the luxuriance of deciduous
forests.
The national park system as now constituted should not
be lowered in standard, dignity, and prestige by the
inclusion of areas which express in less than the highest
terms the particular class or kind of exhibit which they
represent.
It is not necessary that a national park should have a
large area. The element of size is of no importance as long
as the park is susceptible of effective administration and
control.
You should study existing national parks with the idea
of improving them by the addition of adjacent areas which
will complete their scenic purposes or facilitate
administration.The addition of the Teton Mountains to the
Yellowstone National Park, will supply Yellowstone's basic
need, which is an uplift of glacier-bearing peaks; and the
addition to the sequoia National Park of the Sierra summits
and slopes to the north and east, as contemplated by pending
legislation, will create a reservation unique in the world,
because of its combination of gigantic trees, extraordinary
canyons, and mountain masses.
In considering projects involving the establishment of
new national parks or the extension of existing areas by
delimitation of national forests, you should observe what
effect such delimitation would have on the administration of
adjacent forest lands, and wherever practicable, you should
engage in an investigation of such park projects jointly
with officers of the Forest service, in order that questions
of national park and national forest policy as they affect
the lands involves may be thoroughly understood.
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